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Criminal justice is an important part of the response to violent inter-ethnic and 
inter-religious conflict. Criminal trials are usually a key demand of affected 
communities, members of which may themselves engage in violence if they perceive 
that the state will take no action against perpetrators living in their vicinity. When held 
while conflict is ongoing, trials can also have the preventive effect of imprisoning key 
perpetrators of violence and thereby removing them from the conflict setting. There is 
also a moral and philosophical imperative to bring perpetrators to account, lest 
impunity embolden them or others to perpetuate the violence.
These assertions are more than merely an abstract concern for Indonesia, which in 
the immediate post-Suharto period found itself dealing with several instances of large- 
scale murderous inter-religious fighting. One of the worst of these conflicts took place 
in Poso district, Central Sulawesi, where between six hundred to one thousand people, 
both Muslims and Christians, are estimated to have been killed since December 1998. 
Violence peaked in 2000-2001, with more than half of all deaths in the conflict 1
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occurring during those two years. Although violence has lessened since, the district 
has remained the site of sporadic shootings, bombings, and other murders.
Given the scale and persistence of violence in Poso, it may be surprising to learn 
that more than 150 suspects have stood trial for crimes there.2 A few trials took place 
after the initial fighting in the district in December 1998, but the first large set of trials 
started in late 2000. Almost all of the more than one hundred suspects in this set of 
trials were charged over their involvement in the May-June 2000 violence in Poso, in 
which at least 246 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Since then, at least fifty to 
seventy more suspects have faced the courts for various violent incidents occurring 
between late 2000 and 2006. There is no complete data set of all those who have stood 
trial and the sentences they received, but the available information shows that there 
have been significant numbers of both Muslim and Christian defendants. A few of 
those tried have received stern sentences: most notably three death sentences, but also 
a few sentences of between five to fifteen years. The majority of those to stand trial 
though, both Muslims and Christians, have received relatively short sentences—even 
when charged with involvement in killings—and so have been quickly released.
The trials held so far have done little to answer community demands for justice in 
Poso, and have not had a discernable impact on stemming violence. The literature on 
criminal justice and conflict provides several explanations for why criminal trials and 
investigations can be ineffective in responding to conflict situations:3 (i) Police, 
prosecutors, and courts may be overwhelmed by the scale of the violence or cease to 
function altogether, meaning few trials are ever held; (ii) Even after the peak of the 
conflict, it may be difficult to restore or reactivate the police, prosecutors, and courts 
because of the social identification of their officers with one of the combatant parties; 
the particular difficulties of gathering evidence in a conflict setting and social pressures 
on those institutions, such as the threat of retribution, may be further hindrances; (iii) 
With consensus between polarized communities on who should be prosecuted difficult 
to obtain, communities may view the courts' work as "victor's justice;" (iv) Criminal 
trials may actually inflame tensions and make the situation worse, or key perpetrators 
may not be brought to justice because of their influence or problems of jurisdiction;4 (v) 
Victims' families and the affected communities are unlikely to be satisfied with a court 
sentence as closure for the violent death of a loved one; and (vi) Criminal trials are only 
one component of a comprehensive notion of justice, which victims may understand to 
encompass social and economic recovery and reparations in addition to affixing blame 
and meting out punishment.5
2 The total number of those to stand trial may in fact be closer to two hundred.
3 An excellent treatment of the issues discussed in the text is presented in My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice 
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), which set out to measure empirically the contribution of criminal trials 
to post-conflict rebuilding of communities. The following chapters are of particular relevance to the above 
issues: Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation," pp. 1-28; 
Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, "A World unto itself? The Application of International Justice 
in the Former Yugoslavia," pp. 29-48; Alison des Forges and Timothy Longman, "Legal Responses to 
Genocide in Rwanda," pp. 49-68; and Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Conclusion: a Common 
Objective, a Universe of Alternatives," pp. 323-42.
4 On the former point in the specific context of the Maluku conflict, see the report by International Crisis 
Group, The Search for Peace in Maluku, February 2002, p. 25.
5 See Stover and Weinstein, "Introduction," p. 4; Stover and Weinstein, "Conclusion," p. 324.
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A close look at the Poso conflict shows that trials in Central Sulawesi have suffered 
less from those problems than do many of the cases described in the literature. As 
severe as violence in Poso has been, this violence has largely been contained within just 
one of Indonesia's four-hundred-odd districts, and in terms of numbers killed, the 
magnitude of the violence is well below cases of intranational war or genocide such as 
occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This has meant that, outside of Poso 
itself, Indonesia's judicial system has remained intact, and while the task of 
investigating the violence still stretches police and prosecutors, it is not of impossible 
scale.
Moreover, since Poso is not the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi, the nearby 
provincial capital, Palu, although not entirely unaffected by the conflict, has served as 
a location where trials could be held when it was considered too dangerous in Poso.6 
This contrasts with other areas of post-Soeharto inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
conflict, such as in Maluku and North Maluku provinces, where the provincial capitals 
were the scene of serious fighting. Nor are Indonesia's courts institutionally linked to 
one or the other combatant party, reducing (although not eliminating altogether) the 
grounds on which to claim victors' justice.
Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the limited scale of the conflict, which has 
taken place at the district level, also means that many key combatants were local civil 
servants, members of prominent local families, or local youths. (The mujahidin from 
other parts of Indonesia who fought in Poso from late 2000 onward are an obvious 
exception.) These individuals may be able to protect themselves from investigations 
pursued at the local level, but are unlikely to have the connections to shield themselves 
from prosecution in the face of concerted political will from the central government.
What, then, best explains the lack of a discernable contribution on the part of the 
trials held thus far to stemming violence in Poso? Are there particular weaknesses in 
these investigations and trials that, if improved, might enhance their positive impact? 
To answer these questions, this paper focuses on the most prominent manhunt, 
investigation, and trial to arise from the Poso conflict—the case of Fabianus Tibo, 
Dominggus da Silva, and Marinus Riwu. These three men—all Catholics originally 
from East Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT) province involved in a conflict 
primarily fought between Protestants and Muslims—were sentenced to death in April 
2001 in connection with the May-June 2000 phase of fighting in Poso, which, as 
mentioned above, was a period in which hundreds of Muslims were killed. They were 
convicted of murder on the basis that they were "among the leaders" of Christian 
forces in May-June 2000, and in that capacity incited others to kill.7 This
6 Indonesian criminal procedural law allows for trials to be moved from the area where the offence 
occurred at the suggestion of the head of the district court or the head of the district prosecutor's office, 
should the "local situation not permit" the trial to go ahead there (Article 85, Criminal Procedural Code). 
Between 2000-2005, most criminal and terrorism trials stemming from the Poso conflict were thus held in 
Palu; from late 2005, police began to push for high-profile cases to be moved away from Central Sulawesi 
altogether and instead be tried in Jakarta. At the time of writing, seven defendants had been tried for Poso 
violence in courts in Jakarta; the trials of at least another twenty suspects are expected to take place in 
Jakarta in 2007.
7 They were also convicted of arson (Article 187 [1] of the Indonesian Criminal Code, maximum sentence 
of twelve years) and battery (Article 351, maximum sentence of two years and eight months), but these 
two lesser charges were incidental to the trial and are not discussed at any length in this article.
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characterization of the men as "among the leaders" appears to have been accurate for 
Tibo and Dominggus. Each appears to have been more than rank-and-file combatants 
in May-June 2000, though not themselves the highest leaders of Christian forces. We 
know far less about the role of Marinus, either from the trial material or other available 
information.
A close examination of the investigation and trial of the three men reveals several 
procedural shortcomings that served to undermine its contribution to stemming 
violence. The information in Tibo's depositions in particular could have been used to 
develop a clear picture of the command structure of Christian forces in May-June 2000, 
and thereby prosecute other key combatants. Prosecutors instead focused on just the 
three men, which meant that many other key combatants remained free, and over time 
Muslims protested that the death sentences against the three men did not absolve the 
government of the need to investigate other perpetrators of violence against Muslims.
This failing—repeated in many subsequent investigations in Poso—seems all the 
more significant in light of the admittedly limited available evidence from other 
Indonesian conflicts that suggests apprehending a large subset of key perpetrators can 
make a significant contribution to stopping violence. A key example of the success of 
pursuing a larger set of key perpetrators comes from the 2005 Maluku conflict, where 
wide-reaching arrests of those responsible for a string of attacks from May 2004-May 
2005 has all but halted violence in the last twenty months.
Returning to the Tibo case, the prosecutors also did not use all the information in 
the interrogation depositions to file as comprehensive an indictment as possible—one 
that noted the full extent of the men's involvement in the violence and listed all 
possible charges. Considered in isolation, that shortcoming may appear of marginal 
importance, given that the three men could not possibly have received a heavier 
sentence. But as a pattern repeated across many cases, and even if the perpetrators may 
be in prison, it denies communities a clear record of who was responsible for particular 
acts of violence. In addition, when police speculate publicly before trials that the 
suspects are involved in cases for which they are not subsequently charged, it denies 
those individuals the chance to challenge the accusations in court and can lead to 
claims of deliberate "stigmatization."
The procedural quality of the Tibo trial was also poor. The trial took place under 
hostile circumstances, with one witness even managing to slap the three defendants in 
the face before testifying. The judgment was also poorly assembled, with little legal 
reasoning and insufficient clarification of what specific testimony supported the 
judges' conclusions. This doubtless caused some Christian disaffection at the time, but 
far more crucially, when the case became controversial in 2006 after the men's plea for 
clemency was rejected and the executions seemed imminent, it meant that there was no 
clear record of the case against the men. Had the guilt of the men been more clearly 
demonstrated, the scope for protests would have been reduced.
Instead, the execution of the men in September 2006 became a focal point for 
accumulated disaffection with Poso's criminal justice process, and the debate 
preceding their death by firing squad sharpened old religious enmities in Poso. By this 
time, Christians were aggrieved that no other punishments had approached the 
severity of the sentences handed down to Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus, whereas
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Muslims felt the executions were insufficient because other cases of violence had not 
been investigated. The renewed tensions had tangible consequences: a group of 
Christians murdered two Muslim men in Poso district several days after the executions 
took place. Moreover, the same tensions almost led to clashes among rival crowds on 
the fringes of the district's capital city, a pattern of violence absent since 2002.
Before discussing the three men's trial and its shortcomings in detail, this paper 
first provides a brief overview of the Poso conflict. To assist in evaluating the case 
presented against the men during the trial, the essay also sets out current knowledge of 
who Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus were and what their roles were in Poso's May- 
June 2000 violence.
Background: The Poso Conflict
The conflict in Poso—a coastal district of some 200,000—300,000 people—is not 
attributable to any single cause.8 As with the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku 
that also started in the immediate post-Soeharto period, local political contests to 
control state patronage that fed pre-existing tension between religious communities 
and weak law enforcement both contributed to violence, but those two factors did not 
by themselves make the occurrence of violence or its escalation inevitable. A large part 
of the explanation lies in individuals' experience of the conflict and how, over time, 
this led some individuals to perceive members of the other religious community as 
enemies or as an immediate threat to their own security, or both.
There were two periods of violence in Poso prior to May-June 2000 (the point when 
Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus became involved in the conflict). The first of these 
periods was December 24-28, 1998; the second was sixteen months later, April 16-20, 
2000. During each of those periods, violence was contained within the city limits. No 
one was killed in the December 1998 riot, while seven people were killed in April 
2000.9
Although relatively few people were killed in the first two periods of violence, 
Christians fared worse than the Muslims, particularly in terms of property losses. As a 
result, many Christians fled the city during the second period, when several churches 
were burned or damaged. Such targeted violence fed into a pre-existing anxiety among 
Poso's Christian community, including members of the indigenous Pamona ethnic 
group, that they were being marginalized and cut off from political positions, civil- 
service posts, and land ownership by wealthy Muslim migrants, particularly those 
from South Sulawesi province. This anxiety was aggravated by a feeling on the part of 
Christians that few of those individuals whom they held responsible for the first two
8 Fuller accounts of the conflict are provided in Lorraine V. Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central 
Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People," Indonesia 72 (October 2001): 45-69, which provides 
a preliminary chronology of the first three periods; Human Rights Watch, Breakdown: Four Years of 
Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi, December 2002; Anto Sangaji, "Pembakaran Rumput Kering," 
unpublished manuscript; George Aditjondro, "Kerusuhan Poso Dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan Dan 
Jalan Keluarnya," Pro-patria Discussion Paper, January 7, 2004; ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in 
Central Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74, February 3, 2004; ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, 
Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report No. 103, October 13, 2005; and ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on 
the Edge, Asia Report No. 127, January 24, 2007.
9 Three of these were killed when police opened fire on a crowd of Muslims.
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periods of violence had been arrested or brought to trial.10 Immediately after the April 
2000 violence, a sub-section of the Christian community, including some of those 
whose houses had been burned, began to plan for an attack on those they termed 
"perusuh" (rioters) and “provokator" (provocateurs). The result was a third period of 
violence that lasted for two weeks, from late May-June 2000, during which time Tibo, 
Dominggus, and Marinus were recruited to fight.
The May-June 2000 violence was on a much larger scale than anything that had 
occurred previously in Poso. For two weeks there was an almost complete breakdown 
of law and order, and at least 246 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Widespread 
arson destroyed many village and government buildings, and tens of thousands of 
individuals fled from the district in all directions.11 Many Christians describe the May- 
June violence as "revenge" (pembalasan) for the earlier attacks on Christians, but it is 
also common for them to describe it as "defending our territory" (mempertahankan kita 
puny a wilayah). This latter rationalization embodies local Christians' idea that the third 
period of violence was a "spontaneous" defensive response, even though that violence 
was on a far greater scale than what had gone before.12
I'll describe the initial incident of the third period in some detail, because it was at 
this point that Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus first came to public attention in Poso. 
This first incident took the form of a foray by a group of around fifteen black-clad 
Christians into the suburbs of Kayamanya and Moengko before dawn on May 23. The 
group, led by civil servant A. L. Lateka, was looking for specific provokator from earlier 
violence in Poso, but instead killed three men they happened to encounter, including a 
policeman, before fleeing to the nearby Santa Theresia Catholic school compound, in 
Moengko.13 When the group of Christians arrived at the school, Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus were there. A large Muslim crowd, roused by news of the murders, gathered 
in front of the school shortly afterward. Those harbored inside fled, after which the 
Muslim crowd torched the school.
The subsequent violence took several forms: additional small forays (like the May 
23 attack described above); large clashes between rival crowds armed with machetes, 
traditional weapons, and crude homemade firearms; and the murders of hostages 
taken from the other community. The single worst incident during the third period of 
violence took place at and around the Walisongo Islamic boarding school, about nine 
kilometers south of the city.14 After a clash at the boarding school, the Muslim men 
who remained there were killed. Those who fled were rounded up over the course of 
the next few days. In all, around one hundred Muslims were killed in this massacre;
10 Only a few trials were held in response to the first and second periods of violence. The harshest penalty 
in this set of trials was meted out to a Protestant man Herman Parimo, sentenced to fifteen years 
imprisonment for his role in the December 1998 violence. He died in custody in April 2000.
11 The figure of 246 is taken from the Central Sulawesi governor's report on the violence. Given the 
breakdown of law and order and the political uses to which a lower or higher number of casualties could 
be turned, no accurate figure is ever likely to emerge for how many people were killed in May-June 2000. 
Official estimates of casualties in large-scale Indonesian riots have generally been held to be conservative.
12 Interviews with Poso men, February 2002 and July 2003.
13 Lateka's brother-in-law had been imprisoned for involvement in the first period and by late May 2000 
had died in custody. See footnote 10.
14 The boarding school was located near Sintuwulemba village, a location sometimes also called Kilo 9. The 
incident is sometimes referred to using these place names.
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and some of the women taken prisoner appeared to have been sexually assaulted 
before being released.
During the two weeks of violence, Christians established a command post (posko) in 
Tagolu, just south of the city. This is where Tibo, Dominggus, and probably Marinus 
were based for most of the May-June violence. Hundreds, maybe even thousands, of 
Christians gathered there. This command post was only disbanded on June 8, 2000, as 
the violence of the third period waned and security forces made a concerted push into 
Poso. The newly deployed security forces—both police and military—belatedly made 
arrests, seized weapons, and began reburying bodies found around the district. Before 
this, when the unrest was building and peaking, many police and village officials left 
their posts. A few police and military officers even joined with crowds and took part in 
the violence themselves.
The third period of violence marked the shift to protracted conflict in Poso. It 
created a group of angry young Muslim men who had seen family members killed or 
their houses destroyed, and who later recalled that their only thought after this period 
of the conflict was how to take revenge.15 News of the violence, including gruesome 
photos of the remains of murder victims, also drew in Muslim fighters from other parts 
of the country, many of them veterans of the Maluku conflict by the time they arrived 
in Poso. Sporadic violence gradually escalated to a fourth period of conflict in June- 
July 2001 and a fifth in October-December 2001.
In the face of the mounting death toll—around one hundred people were killed in 
2001 alone—government officials brought representatives of the Muslim and Christian 
communities to the negotiating table in late December 2001. The resulting deal—called 
the Malino Agreement—initially brought about some peace and security (in part 
attributable to a large increase in security-force deployment to Poso earlier in 
December), with clashes between crowds becoming rare by late 2002. Low-intensity 
violence continued, though, with more than 150 people killed in Poso after the accord 
was signed. The worst incidents since the accord are nevertheless gravely serious, 
including several large-scale bombings during 2004-2005, the beheading of three 
Christian schoolgirls in October 2005, and, most recently, a shootout in the course of a 
January 2007 police raid, during which more than a dozen Muslim men, most of whom 
were fighting the police, were shot dead (along with one policeman).
As the focus of this essay is on the trial of Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, and 
Marinus Riwu, let's return to the third period of the conflict to chart the extent of their 
involvement. Remembering that these men's murder convictions rested on the judges' 
view that the men were leaders during the May-June 2000 violence, the following 
section aims both to discuss what information is available regarding the status of Tibo, 
Dominggus, and Marinus within the kelompok merah (red group—one name for 
Christian fighters), as well as to map out what is known about the extent of their 
involvement in specific incidents.
15 Interviews with Poso men, July 2003.
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BETELEME
Tibo Group Movements—May 2000
1. Beteleme to Kelei, around May 14; 2. Kelei to Tentena, May 22; 3. Tentena to Moengko Bam, 
May 22; 4. Moengko Baru to Tambaro, May 23; 5. Tambaro to Tentena, May 23-24
The Role of Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus
The prosecution's primary charge against Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus was 
premeditated murder. The prosecution also added the provision of Article 55 (I), 
subclause 1, that the men would be punished as murderers if they had either 
"perpetrated (the murder), ordered others to do so, or taken part (with others in the 
murder)." The murder indictment alleged the men had been involved in four specific 
(multiple) murders: the May 23, 2000, foray into Kayamanya and Moengko (described 
in the previous section); the May 28 Walisongo massacre; murder incidents from May 
28-June 1 near the community health centre (Puskesmas) in Tagolu; and the June I 
murders at a Tagolu sand-mining location on the bank of the Poso river. Note that 
adding Article 55 meant that the prosecution's case did not rest solely on whether the 
three men had participated directly in murders in any specific attacks. The case against 
the three men also incorporated other alleged actions on their part, such as training 
Christian combatants to kill Muslims and acting as leaders during the May-June 2000 
violence. Indeed, by mentioning in the indictment that 191 people had been killed in
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the third period of violence, the prosecutors were implying that the men's actions had 
wider implications than just the four cases listed above.
The next sections set out the role of the men, in terms of their charges and 
convictions. To do so, I use materials other than just the evidence presented during the 
court trial to provide the fullest possible picture of the men's involvement in the May- 
June violence. The narrative is drawn from a comparison of my interviews with the 
men in 2003-04, interviews the three gave to the press around the time of their arrest in 
2000, as well as information from their trial and interrogation dossiers.16 In general, I 
have given less weight to information contained only in interrogation depositions if the 
deponents did not appear as witnesses at the trial, as their non-appearance limits the 
grounds on which to gauge the accuracy of the information.
Fabianus Tibo
The narrative of Tibo's involvement in the Poso violence starts in Beteleme village 
in Morowali district, which lies adjacent to the southeast portion of Poso, where he 
said he worked as a farmer. Tibo, a long-term migrant to Sulawesi from Flores, in the 
archipelagic Nusa Tenggara Timur province, about 800 kilometers south of Poso 
district, turned fifty-five years old immediately before the May-June 2000 violence. The 
most prominent among the three, he appears to have stood as an unsuccessful 
candidate for the now-defunct Democratic Catholic Party in the 1999 election for the 
Poso district legislature. He had previously served a six-year prison term in Poso in the 
early 1990s for his involvement in a dispute between transmigrants from Bali and 
Flores, in Lawangke village, in which four Balinese were killed. This conviction led to a 
widespread belief that Tibo was a -preman (thug), although no specifics are known.17
Tibo's first actions of direct relevance to the May-June 2000 violence were to gather 
a group of men, mostly transmigrants from NTT, to go to Poso. For this, Tibo traveled 
to Malores village, where Marinus lived, also in Morowali district, most likely at some 
point between May 10-14, 2000 (about three weeks after Poso's second period of 
violence). Tibo and the prosecution each promoted different versions of his motives at 
this point. Tibo said he went to gather the men after a Protestant man, whom he had 
never met before, came to his house and told him the students of a Catholic boarding 
school in Poso were in danger. He thus went to Malores, by his account, to warn the 
parents to go and retrieve their children.18 In its indictment, the prosecution stated only
16 The use of information from interrogation dossiers requires particular caution. In the Indonesian 
criminal legal system, each prosecution witness called at the trial must first make a deposition to 
interrogators, but the depositions are often not verbatim records of their deposition. It is also generally not 
possible to know the circumstances under which the depositions were made. Moreover, in other conflict 
trials, witnesses have withdrawn their depositions when called before the court, sometimes with apparent 
justification. Wherever possible, information in interrogation dossiers is used only in comparison with 
other sources.
17 Tracing the details of any preman status may be a fruitful future research project to further elucidate the 
May-June 2000 violence, but it is incidental to this paper.
18 Dominggus stated in his interrogation deposition that he had a grandchild, a nephew, and a niece at the 
school, and that one of the vehicles the group used there was his white Mitsubishi Colt. Marinus stated in 
an interview that he had a child at the school (although he may not have understood the question).
88 Dave McRae
that Tibo gathered men to attack Poso, telling them "this is a matter of religion," and 
ordering those willing to come to Poso to make weapons to bring along.19
The week following this meeting in Malores—May 14-21, 2000—was a crucial 
period for the murder conviction, because any training that Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus provided to the kelompok merah would have taken place during this week. This 
means that the precise date that Tibo arrived in Kelei—the village where training was 
said to have taken place—is a very significant detail. Not surprisingly, Tibo and the 
prosecution presented different versions of his movements.
In interviews with me, Tibo claimed that he and his companions stopped in Kelei 
for just one night, on May 21, after various delays over the course of several days in 
finding transportation from Beteleme to Poso. If true, this would mean Tibo was not in 
Kelei during the period when training is alleged to have occurred, but his account 
seems dubious, as it would seem to suggest a remarkable lack of urgency to leave for 
Poso and rescue the children.
The prosecutors alleged Tibo and his companions arrived in Kelei on May 14. The 
testimony of one witness at the trial, one deposition read out at the trial, and two other 
depositions from members of Tibo's group all describe varying degrees of training, but 
to some extent contradict each other. To my mind, the most credible of these sources 
are the depositions of Tibo's two companions, even though prosecutors did not call 
these men as witnesses or read their depositions out at the trial, meaning the 
information was not admissible as evidence.20
These two men say Tibo and his group arrived in Kelei on or around May 14, and 
while there made weapons to use in Poso and train for the coming violence. They each 
say Tibo told them to make weapons, while Marinus trained them in the use of arrows. 
The two men say they left Kelei for Poso on May 22, after about a week of preparation 
in the village. By this time, they had been given black clothing and wristbands (called 
kongkoli); one of the men told interrogators that Tibo had given the directive, "anyone 
not wearing black clothing or a wristband is the enemy and must be attacked."21 From 
their depositions, Tibo was clearly the leader of their traveling party, but his precise 
authority in a wider setting is not yet clear.
In its indictment, the prosecution was more expansive about the degree of training 
and Tibo's role in it, categorizing him as the overall leader of Christian forces at the 
time. A comparison with Tibo's interrogation dossier makes it clear the phrasing of the 
indictment was based primarily on the deposition of just one individual, named 
Anton, who, as explained in a later section, stands out as the least credible witness at 
the trial.
The next stage in examining Tibo's narrative is to explain how he got from Kelei 
village to the town of Poso, still at least three hours' journey away. It seems clear that 
Tibo and his companions left Kelei early on the morning of May 22, 2000, and before
19 Interview withFabianus Tibo, July 28, 2003. Surat Dakwaan No. Reg. Perkara. PDM-18/POSO/11/2000, p. 3.
20 Their deposihons appear most credible because they were questioned very soon after the events—on 
May 29 and May 30—months before Tibo was arrested and even longer before the other witnesses made 
their statements. Their account also matches most closely with both the prosecution's and Tibo's accounts 
of his other movements in mid to late May 2000.
21 Deposition of Lenoardus Lewa in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, May 30, 2000, p. 2.
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reaching Poso stopped briefly at the majority-Christian town of Tentena, two hours 
south of Poso. Tibo and his group of between twelve and thirty men then arrived at the 
Santa Theresia Catholic School compound in Moengko (Poso suburb) some time 
during the middle of the day. They were now at the school that would be burned the 
next day in the first moments of the May-June 2000 violence (when the Christians, led 
by A. L. Lateka, who themselves had committed violence, fled from the school, as 
described in the previous section). Tibo's accusers have often claimed thatTibo's group 
and Lateka's group were one and the same.
Tibo said that, upon arriving at the school on May 22, he was unable to convince 
the school's principal that the children should flee immediately, because they were in 
the midst of national examinations. Given this situation, Tibo said, he remained at the 
school to guard it, with a plan to take the children home the following day. This is how 
Tibo accounted for being in front of the school before dawn the next morning, on May 
23, clad in black and holding a machete, when a Muslim crowd gathered at the school 
looking for Lateka's group—who were also wearing black—who, the Muslims 
charged, had just murdered three people. Tibo said he had been asleep when the 
murders took place and that the school's children woke him to tell him there was 
trouble in the city and that some men were hiding in the school.22 Thus, Tibo denied 
involvement in the Kayamanya murders on May 23, the first specific incident that the 
prosecution named in its murder indictment.
Tibo's version of events does not ring true and is unlikely to be the whole truth. It 
is possible he and his men were not directly involved in the Kayamanya murders, but 
their very presence at the school, let alone their black clothing and weapons, seems too 
much of a coincidence to be entirely unrelated. But the prosecution's version of the 
morning's events is not correct, either, for the simple reason that it confuses details of 
two different attacks. In its indictment, the prosecution states that Tibo, Dominggus, 
and Marinus led a group of 130 men to attack Moengko and Kayamanya that morning. 
That number is much larger than what witnesses to the attacks remember. A 
comparison with Tibo's interrogation deposition shows that the number "130" actually 
comes from his description of an attack on Moengko that took place about a week 
later.23
The confusion surrounding Tibo's exact role in the morning's events 
notwithstanding, it is clear that, after being found outside the school, Tibo handed over 
his machete to police. Despite the presence of the increasingly large crowd of Muslims 
and a request from the policemen present that he accompany them to Poso's police 
station, Tibo somehow managed to flee into the forested hills behind the school 
complex. Most of Tibo's men, Lateka's group, and the school's students and teachers 
also made their escape. These various groups headed south toward the majority- 
Christian areas of Poso, first to Tambaro village just south of the city and then farther 
south, to Tentena. Behind them, the crowd torched the school complex.
The next day, May 24, Tibo says he was taken from Tentena back to Kelei village, 
the reputed site of kelompok merah training. There he attended a meeting with around 
ten people, including A. L. Lateka and another man Tibo named as a key kelompok
22 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2003.
23 Deposibon of Fabianus Tibo in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2000, p. 3.
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merah leader, retired Protestant military officer Paulus Tungkanan.24 According to Tibo, 
at this meeting Lateka gave the order to raze Poso.25 Although Tibo depicts his 
presence at the meeting as the product of coercion—saying Lateka prevented him from 
returning to his home village of Beteleme—Tibo's attendance is another sign that he 
was a kelompok merah leader (given that the other attendees were also figures of 
authority). By comparison, Dominggus and Marinus do not appear to have attended.
Thereafter, Tibo again says he was taken back to the outskirts of the city, to Tagolu 
village, probably early on the morning of May 25, and appears to have been primarily 
based there until June 8. While in Tagolu, says he, he stayed at the command post 
(posko) that Christians had set up in the house of Bakte Lateka, the younger brother of 
A. L. Lateka.
The most detailed account of Tibo's presence in Tagolu comes from one of the 
interrogation depositions read out at the trial in lieu of the witness appearing before 
the court to testify—that of Ros Kristina, a Christian woman. She said Muslim captives 
were brought to Tibo for questioning at the posko, and that Tibo then handed over the 
prisoners to others, including Dominggus and Marinus, to be “diamankan" (secured), 
which was a euphemism for murder. According to Ros Kristina's deposition, 
Dominggus reported to Tibo about murders at other locations in Tagolu, although due 
to her involuntary presence as a forced laborer in the posko itself, she did not actually 
witness these murders herself.26
The accounts of Muslim captives who appeared as witnesses at the trial were not as 
detailed as Kristina's, but their testimony corroborates some aspects of her deposition 
and depicts Tibo as a figure of authority in Tagolu. One, Taiyeb Lamelo, testified that 
when he was first brought to Tagolu, Tibo asked for his identity card (Kartu Tanda 
Penduduk, KTP) and later assured him he would not be hurt. Lamelo also testified that 
when kelompok merah members from his village came to ask that Lamelo be allowed to 
return home, they met with Tibo (to secure his release).27 Another Muslim man 
captured and held in Tagolu, Mahfud Rosid, testified that all three defendants were
24 Tungkanan moved to Tentena in April after suffering a large slash wound to his back in the second 
phase. He has never stood trial, but was arrested in May 2004 on suspicion of firearms possession. He was 
released without charge, and those familiar with the investigation following his arrest told me that it 
appears to have focused as much on Tungkanan's involvement in the May-June 2000 violence as on the 
firearms charge. The figure of ten attendees at the Kelei meeting comes from interviews with the author; in 
his depositions, Tibo said forty people attended. Information from interviews with Paulus Tungkanan, 
February 2002 and June 2006; with Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2003; with Dominggus, May 2004; and with a 
Palu lawyer, June 2006. Also: interrogation deposition of Fabianus Tibo, in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 
26, 2000, p. 5.
25 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003. When interviewed, Tibo volunteered incidental details of this 
meeting that make his claim that he was present appear authentic. For instance, he recalled Lateka had 
been angry because Tungkanan arrived late and thereby kept everyone waiting. See also interrogation 
deposition of Fabianus Tibo, in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 26, 2000, p. 6.
26 Deposition of Ros Kristina in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 6 and 7, 2000.
27 If this account is true, it suggests that the village affiliations between Lamelo and the kelompok merah 
members trumped their religious difference. Record of testimony of Taiyeb Lamelo, in Decision o f Palu 
District Court No. 459/PID.B/2000/PN.PL in case o f Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, and Marinus Riwu 
(hereafter Tibo Decision), pp. 43-44.
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present at the Tagolu command post and that all decisions had to be cleared by them; 
he also said he was ordered to give Tibo a massage.28
The prosecution's indictment alleged Tibo took part in four distinct attacks, and 
implied that other Muslim deaths in the May-June 2000 violence were the result of his 
actions. Tibo denied involvement in the murders specifically named by the 
prosecution, but in his depositions and interviews with me he made it clear that he 
took part directly in attacks during the two weeks he was in Tagolu. He admits to 
taking part directly or being present at four clashes during the May-June 2000 
violence:
• May 25: Sepe-Silanca village. Christians clashed with Muslims attempting to 
advance toward Tagolu from the majority-Muslim areas east of the city. Tibo 
admits his presence in his interrogation deposition; residents of the villages also 
recall seeing Tibo there.29
• May 28: Sayo village. Tibo describes this clash, on the southern outskirts of the 
city, as an attempt to rescue nine Christians trapped in Sayo the previous day 
during another attack on the village.30
• May 28: Walisongo. Tibo admits being present at or around the Walisongo 
boarding school on the day it was attacked, May 28. His account is inconsistent 
in different sources, however. In his interrogation dossier he says he arrived in 
Walisongo only after the kelompok merah had surrounded the mosque there, and 
that he left again before the violence proper began, after being struck by a dart 
(anak peluncur). When I interviewed Tibo in 2003, he said that he arrived at 
Walisongo only after the violence there had occurred, saying when he got back 
to Tagolu from Sayo the women there told him "It's already [happened] in Kilo 
9 [Walisongo]. It's been razed."31 One witness at the trial—a Muslim survivor of 
the Walisongo violence—also testified that Tibo led the attack.32
• Late May or early June: Moengko. The fourth attack Tibo admitted to leading 
or taking part in took place in the city suburb of Moengko in the last days of 
May or early June 2000. Tibo's account of the attack (from his interrogation 
deposition) says he led 130 men in the attack, clashed with the kelompok putih 
(one name for Muslim fighters) for half an hour, and then burned six houses.33 
In an interview with me in 2003, Tibo described this attack as a "dawn raid" 
(serangan fajar), claimed it was the only occasion Christians had attacked the
28 Ibid., pp. 27-28 (record of Matifud Rosid Kusni testimony).
29 This attack was not directed at Sepe and Silanca, winch were majority Christian villages. Once 
Christians gained the ascendancy in this part of Poso, they burned many of the nearby Muslim 
settlements. It is possible that the specific attack Tibo referred to in fact took place on May 26.
30 References to the dates of the Sayo attacks are inconsistent. They appear to have taken place on May 27 
and 28, but may also have taken place on May 28 and 29. In a deposition in the dossier of Marinus Riwu, 
Tibo says the attack on Sayo occurred because they had heard that a church in the neighboring suburb of 
Kawua would be attacked.
31 A Protestant policeman who went to Walisongo also testified that he requested Tibo's permission, as 
leader of the kelompok merah, to go there. Record of testimony of Hopni Saribu, Tibo Decision, p. 43.
32 Another witness, Sutarmin, said Tibo was the leader when the kelompok merah killed captives three days 
after the Walisongo attack. See Record of testimony of Ilham, Untung Djumadi, Tibo Decision, pp. 32-33.
33 Interrogation deposition of Fabianus Tibo in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2000, p. 3.
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city, and said that the raid was ordered by Paulus Tungkanan. He said the 
kelompok merah members (Christians) withdrew after one of their number was 
shot dead, without mentioning whether there were any kelompok putih (Muslim) 
casualties.34
After these attacks, the next clear record of Tibo's whereabouts places him at two 
peace meetings in early June, held on consecutive days as the violence of the third 
period began to wane.35 Both the Deputy Head of Central Sulawesi Police and the 
newly appointed Poso Police Chief, Superintendent Djasman Baso Opu, were present 
at each meeting, but no attempt was made to take Tibo into custody.36 His presence at 
the first meeting in particular, where he appeared as a representative of the kelompok 
merah and shook hands with several Muslim men, strengthens the picture that Tibo 
was more than an ordinary combatant.37
After these meetings, by which time the Tagolu command post had been 
disbanded, Tibo's interrogation depositions suggest that he spent two nights in Kuku 
village, south of Tagolu, and a week in Tentena. We know no further details of his 
activities prior to his arrest in Jamur Jaya village, near Beteleme, at the end of July.
The consistent impression from the available material is that Tibo was much more 
than a rank-and-file combatant. There are allegations that he provided training and 
acted as a leader in Tagolu, and he himself admits taking part in some attacks 
(although he does not admit to killing anyone). In his own depositions, found in his 
interrogation dossier, which he acknowledged as correct during the trial but later 
disparaged, Tibo constantly described himself as a figure of authority. In the 
depositions, he describes himself as leading crowds in different locations, explains 
tactics he instituted to fool the kelompok merah's adversaries into thinking they were 
fighting far more men than was the case, and says he negotiated with the kelompok 
putih in Walisongo to get them to lay down their weapons.
What isn't clear from this material is his exact position within the kelompok merah 
hierarchy. Tibo's own description, both in his depositions and interviews with me, 
depicts him having been very much ordered around by Lateka and Tungkanan rather 
than making decisions himself.38 This accords with the perception popular even among
34 Interview with Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2003.
35 The dates in different accounts of the meetings are not consistent, but these meetings took place at the 
end of the first week of June, most probably on June 8 and 9. However, some sources place the meetings 
on June 6 and 7. Tibo's attendance is not in doubt, though; he himself admits being present, and numerous 
other sources provide details.
36 At the meeting in Tentena, a Protestant minister, Reverend Rinaldy Damanik, read out loud "Lateka's 
mandate"—a justification of the violence during the preceding two weeks addressed to the National 
Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and penned by Ir. AL Lateka, the kelompok merah leader 
who led the first foray into the city, and who was killed in fighting in Kayamanya suburb on June 2, 2000. 
For an account of the reading and a mostly accurate transcript of Lateka's letter, see Darwis Warn, 
"Memperjuangkan Amanat Lateka," Formasi 48, July 2000. A photocopy of Lateka's letter is in the author's 
possession.
37 One of the Muslim men recounted that the police guarded Tibo extremely closely, but were less 
concerned about other Christian men present at this meeting. He expressed his displeasure at participating 
in the meeting, but had wanted to see what Tibo looked like. Interview, Poso, July 2003. Also see 
"Kelompok Merah akan Turun Poso," Mercusuar, June 10, 2000.
38 In his depositions, Tibo named Paulus Tungkanan and another man, "Erik" (probably Erik Rombot), as 
the highest leaders in Tagolu, saying that he and several other men carried out their orders. Lateka was
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most of his accusers—that Tibo was a field commander but by no means the highest 
authority within the kelompok merah.
Dominggus da Silva
Before the May-June 2000 violence in Poso, Dominggus da Silva lived just across 
the provincial border in Soroako, in South Sulawesi, the site of the large PT Inco nickel 
mine. When I interviewed him in prison, Dominggus said he had been a mechanic at 
the mine. He had known Tibo for many years before May 2000, he said, as Dominggus 
frequently visited Beteleme, where Tibo lived.39 He was thirty-two when the violence 
started in May 2000.
Many of Dominggus's movements immediately prior to the third period of 
violence were similar to those of Tibo, so only the differences are described here. After 
being recruited by Tibo to travel to Poso in May 2000, Dominggus, like Tibo, traveled 
to Kelei at some point between May 14-21, probably at the beginning of that time 
period. Most of the information on military-style training for Christians in Kelei does 
not provide any indication of what role Dominggus played there, however, with the 
exception of the dubious testimony of the witness Anton, who testified that 
Dominggus taught him to kill without leaving a mark.40 Dominggus then traveled with 
Tibo to the Santa Theresia school on May 22, was present at the school on the morning 
of May 23 when the third period of violence began, and, like Tibo, fled south via 
Tentena, only to be back in Kelei by May 24.
One deposition from a member of Tibo's group arrested at the Santa Theresia 
school on May 23 suggests Dominggus was an authority figure within that group, 
naming Dominggus as one of three leaders of the group at that point. Whatever 
authority he held within the wider context of the kelompok merah appears to have been 
less than that held by Tibo, however. This is assumed because, although Dominggus 
was present in Kelei village on May 24 when the meeting of key kelompok merah 
personnel took place, Tibo himself asserted in interviews that Dominggus was not 
among the participants at the meeting.41
After the meeting, Dominggus—as did Tibo—apparently went to the Christian 
command post in Tagolu, where it appears he was based from May 25 until at least 
June 5, 2000.42 Dominggus, like Tibo, featured prominently in the deposition of Ros
primarily active elsewhere in Poso. Interviews with Fabianus Tibo, July 2003 and May 2004. Deposition of 
Fabianus Tibo in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2000.
39 Interviews with Dominggus, July 28, 2003 and May 2004. The request for judicial review filed by the 
men's third defense team says Dominggus was a public transport driver in Beteleme. See Tim Pembela 
Padma Indonesia, Memori Peninjauan Kembali, February 2006, p. 6.
40 This contrasts with Anton's interrogation deposition, where he says Dominggus taught fighting with 
knives.
41 In his interrogation dossier, Dominggus says only that he stayed at the house of Bram Parimo in Kelei. 
Bram was the son of A. L. Lateka's son-in-law, Herman Parimo, who died in custody shortly before the 
third period of violence. Source: deposition of Dominggus da Silva in dossier of Dominggus da Silva, 
August 1, 2000, p. 4.
42 Dominggus says in his deposition as a witness in Tibo's dossier that he went to Tagolu later than Tibo 
and Marinus, on May 26. If true, this conflicts with a possible sighting of him near Tagolu on the night of 
May 25 (see below).
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Kristina, the Christian woman whose deposition was read at the trial. As noted earlier, 
her deposition said Tibo would pass Muslim captives to Dominggus to be "secured" 
(murdered). Her deposition, while not based on firsthand evidence, said Dominggus 
participated directly in these murders, a conclusion based on his reports to Tibo. 
Kristina's deposition also noted that, when the posko was disbanded, Dominggus took 
her by car to Tentena, stopping at each village along the road and telling them to man 
their guard posts, as well as introducing her as his aide.
One of the same captives who testified about Tibo's involvement also testified 
regarding Dominggus's activities, although (as with Tibo) in substantially less detail 
than Kristina's deposition. The captive, Taiyeb Lamelo, said that, after being captured 
in his home village, he was taken north to Tagolu, Sangira. Dominggus was in the car, 
and they stopped along the way to burn corpses that had been dumped in a ditch.43 In 
his trial testimony, Dominggus admitted being in the vehicle, but provided a different 
version of events. According to Dominggus, the kelompok merah in Lamelo's village 
were going to assault him, and Dominggus saved Lamelo; as for the bodies, others had 
already burned them before the men passed by in the car, he said.44
Outside of the report noting Dominggus's presence at the command post, the 
earliest mention of Dominggus in Poso after his arrival in Tagolu places him there on 
the night of May 25. A press interview with a survivor of the Walisongo massacre 
placed Dominggus at the Walisongo Islamic boarding school that night, three days 
before the massacre there. At the time, Christians and Muslims at the school negotiated 
a short-lived agreement that the school would not be attacked if they took down a two- 
wave radio (HT) antenna. The interviewee said that one of the men negotiating for the 
Christians identified himself as Dominikus D, an apparent reference to Dominggus.45
A policeman who was also present at Walisongo that night testified during the trial 
that Dominggus appropriated his truck the next day, May 26, in front of the Lage 
police station in Tagolu, purportedly to transport IDPs. Appropriating a police truck 
seems beyond the authority of a mere rank-and-file combatant. The policeman also 
said that he had seen Dominggus shouting instructions to subordinates.46
After this, in one of the initial depositions in his interrogation dossier, Dominggus 
admits to leading an attack on Sayo village, just north of Tagolu, in which ten houses 
were burned, one by Dominggus himself.47 This account probably refers to an attack on 
May 27.48 No kelompok putih members were killed during this attack, he said, but one 
Christian died.49
43 Record of Testimony of Taiyeb Lamelo, Tibo Decision, pp. 43-44.
44 Record of testimony of Dominggus da Silva, Tibo Decision, p. 52.
45 Recording of Darwis Warn interview with II, made available to the author.
46 The policeman said Dominggus took the truck on threat of force; Dominggus said the policeman 
allowed him use of the truck only after Dominggus gave the policeman Rp50,000 for diesel fuel. A 
comparison with Dominggus's interrogation depositions suggests he may have used the truck in Silanca. 
Interview with Dominggus da Silva, July 28, 2003. Record of testimony of Moh Najib, Tibo Decision, pp. 36- 
37.
47 In a later interrogation session Dominggus said he did not know who led the attack.
48 Or May 28. Dominggus said during his interrogation (according to the dossier) that this was on June 1, 
but there is reason to believe he was mistaken. For instance, during the trial he responded to the testimony
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It is not clear whether Dominggus was present at the Walisongo attack on May 28. 
In his interrogation dossier and interviews he denies being there, saying he was in 
Sayo when it took place, and the record of his testimony in the defense plea contains 
no admission of his presence. But the records of the same testimony in the 
prosecution's sentencing request and in the judgment says he admitted being present 
when the Al-Hijrah mosque (the mosque at Walisongo) was attacked. A survivor of the 
attack also testified that Dominggus led the attack, although inconsistencies between 
this witness's two interrogation depositions place doubt on this testimony.49 50
The next clear account of Dominggus's whereabouts is provided by the testimony 
of two women held prisoner in Tambaro village after the Walisongo attack, who stated 
during the trial that Dominggus sexually assaulted them there on the night of June l .51 
The women testified that Dominggus ordered them to strip naked and then inspected 
their vaginas to check to see if they were wearing magic amulets.52 Dominggus denied 
taking part in sexual assaults but did admit his presence in the village. His testimony 
in his defense on this point actually adds to the impression that he held authority 
within the kelompok merah. His explanation was that he had stopped off in Tambaro 
that night for only ten minutes, just after 11:00 PM, to see if there were women from 
Lamasi village there. Before that evening, Dominggus said, he had saved four Muslim 
men from Lamasi who were being held captive in a truck by seven kelompok merah 
members who planned to murder the Muslims. Dominggus took them off the truck, 
and sent them to safety at the military company headquarters. Following this event, 
Dominggus said he traveled to Tambaro, where the men's wives were being held, 
because he wanted to tell the women that he had saved their husbands from being 
executed.53 If true, his account of himself as being able to intervene to take captives 
away from other kelompok merah members, even when they were intent on killing them, 
suggests he held more authority than just a rank-and-file combatant.
After June 1, there are fewer specific details of Dominggus's whereabouts. A 
statement he made long after his trial indicates he was in Tambaro village on June 5, 
which, because of its proximity, suggests he was staying in Tagolu.54 Thereafter, the
of Sutarmin, who claimed that Dominggus led the attack on Walisongo, by saying he was in Sayo that 
morning. See Tibo Decision, p. 29.
49 Interrogation deposition of Dominggus da Silva, August 1, 2000, p. 4. In the same deposition,
Dominggus also denies involvement in attacks on four other villages.
50 Questioned on June 10, 2000, before the arrest of Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus, Sutarmin did not 
identify any of the kelompok merah attackers and said they wore masks. When police questioned him again 
after the three men's arrest, they showed him a photograph of the three in the newspaper and asked him 
whether he knew the three men. He said they were the "perpetrators of murders" in Sintuwulemba on 
May 28, but the manner of their identification—from a newspaper image rather than from a set of 
photos—casts doubt on its validity. He also made detailed claims about the role of Tibo and Marinus in 
his second deposition, which he does not appear to have repeated during the trial. See deposition of 
Sutarmin in the dossier of Fabianus Tibo, June 10, 2000 and August 20, 2000.
51 Interrogation deposition of Dominggus da Silva, August 2, 2000, in dossier of Dominggus da Silva.
52 Record of testimony of Siti Munawarah and Sufiah Siswandi, Tibo Decision, pp. 42—45.
53 He said he had put them on an IDP truck leaving for the military company headquarters in the city 
suburb of Kawua. Interrogation deposition of Dominggus da Silva, August 2, 2000, pp. 2-3.
54 Dominggus's statement, signed by Tibo, described him apprehending a Christian man, Herry 
Mangkawa, who the statement said had obstructed a kelompok merah attack on May 31, 2000. The statement 
was part of an appeal by Mangkawa against a twelve-year sentence for taking prisoners on May 31 and by
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next mention of Dominggus's presence is at the peace meeting in Tentena on June 9 
(described earlier). This in turn is the last detail describing his whereabouts prior to his 
arrest in early August 2000.
The impression from this material is that Dominggus, like Tibo, was a figure of 
authority within the kelompok merah. It is clear even from his own account that he took 
part in at least some attacks and was probably in Kelei when kelompok merah training 
took place. His dealings with police—both the appropriation of the truck and a 
comment during interviews with me that he had tried to call the Poso police chief 
repeatedly to demand that he send police to deal with crowds—also seem to show that 
he had authority beyond that of an ordinary combatant.55 His precise role, though, 
appears to have differed from that of Tibo's, as his authority seems to have been less.
Marinus Riwu
Marinus was born in NTT province's capital city, Kupang, on the west coast of 
West Timor. He was also a long term migrant to Sulawesi, and said he had known Tibo 
since buying a generator from him shortly after Marinus arrived in Sulawesi.56 He was 
forty-two when the violence started in May 2000.
We have a much less clear picture of the status and movements of Marinus during 
the third period of violence than we do of the other two men. The case presented 
against him in the trial was weak, and he is mentioned less often in depositions. An 
unreliable witness testified that Marinus trained other Christians in the use of arrows,57 
and Ros Kristina's deposition mentions him as Dominggus's accomplice at the Tagolu 
command post. But apart from that, he was hardly mentioned.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Marinus followed a path similar to that of Tibo and 
Dominggus prior to the third period and during the early moments of the May-June 
violence. It was in Marinus's village, Malores, that Tibo says he began to gather a 
group to go to Poso, and Marinus was one of those to go along. Like the other two 
men, Marinus stopped in Kelei on the way to Poso, arrived at the Santa Theresia school 
on May 22, fled when it was burned down on May 23, and then made his way via 
Tentena to be back in Kelei on May 24.
Marinus claimed both in his deposition and in interviews with me that he took part 
in only one clash after May 24, in Sepe village near Tagolu (probably on May 25). Even 
then, Marinus said, he developed cramps in his leg on the way to the attack. Because of
so doing contributing to their death. Kesaksian (testimony), handwritten statement signed by Fabianus 
Tibo and Dominggus da Silva, dated September 26, 2002.
55 Interviews with Dominggus, July 2003 and May 2004; and record of testimony of Muh Najib, in Tibo 
Decision, pp. 36-37.
56 He says he met Dominggus only when they arrived at the school in Moengko, as the two of them had 
come to Poso in different vehicles. Interview with Marinus, July 29, 2003.
57 This claim was corrobrated by two depositions of members of Tibo's group arrested at the very 
beginning of the May-June 2000 violence. Their depositions, however, were not read out at the trial.
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his condition, he said, he turned around and returned to his village, Malores, in 
Morowali district, and did not come back to Poso until after his arrest.58
Despite his claim, it is more probable that he was based at the command post in 
Tagolu for most of the May-June 2000 violence, as various pieces of information 
contradict his claim to have left Poso on May 25. Tibo stated in a deposition that 
Marinus took part in the May-June attack on Moengko, which would have been days 
after Marinus claimed he went back to Malores.59 Asked about this contradiction 
during an interrogation session in which he was "confronted" with Tibo's claim, 
Marinus admitted that he took part in this later attack.60 In addition, in one of the few 
mentions during the trial of Marinus's whereabouts, two witnesses testified that 
Marinus was still in Poso after May 25. The two women who testified that Dominggus 
had sexually assaulted them also claimed that Marinus was present in Tambaro 
village, which would place him there on June l .61 Another witness, Mahfud Rosid, who 
was held captive in Tagolu during the third phase, testified that all three defendants 
were present in Tagolu while Rosid was there, although the record of his testimony 
does not give a date. Finally, Ros Kristina's deposition also mentions Marinus as 
present in Tagolu, and describes him as being an accomplice along with Dominggus 
and Tibo in the murder of prisoners.
A final mention of Marinus came from the deposition of Apson Parera Patras, who 
stated Marinus had led an arson attack on Toinasa village on June 16, 2000.62 Although 
the prosecution included this detail in its indictment, it did not present Patras as a 
witness during the trial, nor does it appear to have produced any other evidence to 
support this charge.
It is clear that Marinus was involved in the May-June 2000 violence and that he 
probably provided some degree of training in Kelei, but beyond this we have little 
basis on which to gauge his exact role. To the extent that he may have held authority, it 
appears to have been less than that of Tibo and Dominggus. The three men were 
actually directly questioned on their relative authority during a "confrontation" 
interrogation (when each is asked to answer the same question in turn in each other's 
presence). Asked which of the three was regarded as the more senior (dituakan) in their 
group, each gave the facetious answer that Tibo was clearly the oldest, relying on a 
play on Indonesian words to misinterpret the question.63
58 Interview with Marinus Riwu, July 29, 2003. A substantially similar account appears in liis interrogation 
dossier, see deposition of Marinus Riwu in dossier of Marinus Riwu, August 1, 2000, pp. 3—4.
59 See deposition of Fabianus Tibo in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, July 28, 2000, p. 7.
60 In answer to the police quesbon of whether it was true that Marinus had taken part in an attack in wliich 
fifteen houses were burned, Tibo answers that he and Marinus had taken part in an attack, but that he did 
not know who had burned houses. Marinus then answers that he and Tibo took part in an attack and 
burned houses at the time. No specific details of date or location are provided, but examination of Tibo's 
deposition in Marinus's dossier makes it clear that the question could only refer to the Moengko attack.
See Berita Acara Konfrontasi in dossier of Marinus Riwu, October 6, 2000, p. 2; and deposition of Fabianus 
Tibo in dossier of Marinus Riwu, August 10, 2000.
61 Record of testimony of Sufiah Siswandi, Siti Munawarah, Tibo Decision, pp. 42-43, 44—45.
62 Deposition of Apson Parera Patras, in dossier of Marinus Riwu, August 17, 2000, p. 2.
63 Berita Acara Konfrontasi in dossier of Marinus Riwu, October 6, 2000.
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Key Locations: The Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus indictment
The Trial
The trial of Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus commenced at the Palu District Court 
on December 11, 2000.64 In accordance with Indonesia's civil-law system, a three-judge 
panel presided over the case, chaired by Soedarmo, a Muslim, with one Muslim and a 
Christian (Protestant) as the other panel members.65 The trial was held in Palu because 
of continuing instability in Poso. Even in Palu, angry crowds gathered outside the 
court for each session and sometimes threw rocks at the courthouse, although the
64 A much shorter, early account of the trial published six months after its conclusion is provided in 
Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso," but it reflects the inaccuracies of media reporting at the time.
1,5 The judges were Soedarmo, Ach Fauzi (both Muslim), and Ferdinandus.
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disturbances did not escalate into a more serious disruption of the trial. Each of the 
trial's sixteen sessions over the course of almost four months was also subject to 
extensive media coverage, indicative of the intense public interest.66
The prosecution presented nineteen witnesses, read the interrogation depositions 
of seven others, and submitted sixteen pieces of physical evidence. Of the nineteen 
witnesses who appeared, seven were Muslims who escaped the May 28, 2000, attack at 
Walisongo, or who suffered sexual assault shortly thereafter; five were members of the 
security forces (four police and a military intelligence officer); two were members of a 
team that evacuated corpses after the May-June 2000 violence; two had been held 
captive by the kelompok merah during the riot; one was a member of the kelompok merah; 
one claimed to have infiltrated the kelompok merah; and the final prosecution witness 
was the Poso district head (bupati).
In Indonesian criminal trials, defendants take the stand themselves after the 
prosecution has presented all of its witnesses. The defense then has the opportunity to 
present its own witnesses. In this trial, there were three defense witnesses: two 
members of the Central Sulawesi Christian church and a teacher from the Santa 
Theresia school.67
Once all the testimony has been entered, the prosecution submits a sentencing 
request. This is followed by the defense plea, after which each party makes its 
concluding statements. The following section provides a summary and commentary on 
the arguments presented at trial, based primarily on the written record.
Trial Testimony, Sentencing Request, and the Defense
No witnesses actually saw the men commit murder; as such, the charge of murder 
came to rest on the allegation that Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus incited or ordered 
others to commit violence. Testimony about the men's authority and positions within 
the kelompok merah therefore became integral to the prosecution's case. As outlined 
above, several witnesses gave testimony that shed some light on the men's authority, 
but the judgment suggests that the key prosecution witness was Anton (an alias), a 
Muslim man who claimed to have infiltrated kelompok merah training in Kelei village 
prior to the third period.68 He testified in detail regarding a timetable for the training 
and said Marinus taught fighters how to use arrows, Dominggus taught to kill without 
leaving a mark, and Tibo gave instructions and doctrinal explanations at night 
regarding the coming attacks on Poso. He also said each man led his own group of 
fighters: Tibo, armed with an M16 rifle, led the hundred-strong Bat Force (Pasukan
66 The print media went to unusual lengths to publish anything about Tibo, including two "imaginary 
interviews" that melded distorted quotes from his police interrogation depositions. A Palu journalist 
remarked that, for a time, any mention of Tibo was guaranteed to sell newspapers (private 
correspondence with Palu journalist, January 2002). For imaginary interviews, see "Saya pimpin seratus 
orang," Formasi 54, October 2000; and "Saya pimpin penyerangan ke Sayo," Formasi 55, November 2000.
67 The GKST members were Rinaldy Damanik and Misdianto Posende; the teacher was Yosefina. It is not 
uncommon in Indonesian trials for the defense to call few or no witnesses. When interviewed nine months 
after the trial's conclusion, however, one of the defense lawyers lamented the unwillingness of Poso's 
indigenous Protestants to come forward. Interview with defense lawyer, January 2002.
68 The question of Anton's credibility is discussed in a subsequent section on the fairness of the trial.
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Kelelawar); Dominggus, armed with a pistol, led the three hundred-strong Tiger Force 
(Pasukan Macan), while Marinus led a force armed with arrows.69 70
To corroborate Anton's account, the prosecution read out the deposition of Junior 
Bobi Tingginehe, a Protestant originally from the Sanger Talaud archipelago in North 
Sulawesi. Police questioned him on the same day they questioned Anton, in November 
2000/° Tingginehe's deposition also contained the statement that Tibo led the training 
in Kelei and gave the instruction that "kelompok putih must be killed" if they stood in 
the way of the kelompok merah. He also said Marinus provided some training, but did 
not mention Dominggus. Where Anton claimed the training went on for forty-two 
days, however, Tingginehe said it took place only from May 12-21, and he does not 
mention seeing factory-standard weapons.71
Given the importance of Tingginehe's deposition, particularly as it relates directly 
to Anton's testimony, it is curious that the prosecution did not present him in person 
as a witness during the trial. Admittedly, under the Indonesian criminal procedural 
code, if there is a valid obstacle to the witness attending the trial, their sworn 
deposition may be read out in the trial and has the same evidentiary status as witness 
testimony.72 But reading out a sworn deposition is clearly not the same as questioning 
a witness in person, as there is no opportunity to clarify that person's answers or ask 
additional questions. The wording of the criminal procedural code anticipates that 
distance may be one obstacle to a witness attending the trial; this was not an obstacle in 
Tingginehe's case, as he appears to have been in custody in Palu at the time of the trial.
The same can be said of the decision to read out Ros Kristina's deposition, 
described at some length earlier, rather than presenting her as a witness. This use of 
written depositions rather than witness testimony was one point the three men's 
lawyers raised in their defense plea.
If it is curious that the prosecution read out Tingginehe's and Kristina's 
depositions, it is more puzzling that they did not read out the two depositions of 
Leonardus Lewa and Rafael Sina, the members of Tibo's group arrested on May 23, 
just after Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus fled the Santa Theresia school. Those 
depositions contained the earliest information on training obtained by the 
interrogators, and was obtained within ten days of the period during which it was 
alleged training had occurred. Because they did not read out the depositions or call the 
men as witnesses, the prosecutors did not enter their information as testimony.
In the opinion of the judges, the defendants' depositions contained important 
evidence in support of a conviction. These are mentioned specifically in the judgment 
along with Anton's testimony; no other witnesses or depositions are specifically 
mentioned. It is not uncommon for defendants to claim during the trial that 
information in their dossiers should be inadmissible, on the basis that they were forced 
during interrogation to confess. When they were asked during their trial whether their
69 Record of testimony of Anton in Tibo Decision, p. 40.
70 Tingginehe was himself sentenced to six years in prison for kicking two Muslim men who were fatally 
lynched by a crowd in front of the BRI bank in Tentena. See "Pembunuh di Tentena Divonis Tujuh 
Tahun," Mercusmr, date not recorded.
71 Interrogation deposition of Junior Bobi Tingginehe, in dossier of Fabianus Tibo, November 4, 2000.
72 Article 162, Criminal Procedural Code.
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depositions were correct, the Palu District Court judgment indicates that Tibo, 
Dominggus, and Marinus acknowledged their depositions' veracity. In Tibo's case in 
particular, this is a strange detail, given his subsequent denial of involvement in the 
May-June 2000 violence, as the material in his interrogation depositions is at least as 
incriminating as the witness testimony given during the trial.73 Tibo later said in 
interviews that the information in the deposition was "somewhat different" from what 
he had told interrogators. In contrast, Dominggus actively encouraged me to obtain a 
copy of his deposition, while Marinus said the information in his was "very light" (that 
is, not incriminating).74
The previous section outlined the different roles that Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus appeared to play. In its indictment in particular, but also in the sentencing 
request, the prosecution often made little differentiation regarding the disparate roles 
of the three men, frequently referring to them collectively as "the defendants" or "the 
defendants and other kelompok merah members." The most explicit differentiation the 
prosecution made of the alleged role of each defendant in the May-June 2000 violence 
was provided in their sentencing request:
"Tibo was the leader who determined the movements of the kelompok merah or at 
least was an individual held in esteem within the kelompok merah during the 
period of their attacks on Muslims..."
"Dominggus with his fearsome looks was the Field Commander who appeared 
cruel and fierce in attacking and murdering Muslims."
"Marinus was directly involved in the murder of Muslims; planning in Melores 
[sic], Kelei, and Tagolu; and attacks in Poso."75
The prosecutors also made no differentiation among the men regarding the 
punishment sought for the alleged crimes, seeking the death penalty for each of the 
men. They noted Tibo had been sentenced previously to six years imprisonment in an 
earlier case, and that the defendants acted sadistically in causing the death of many 
people, thereby causing misery for their victims' widows and children, as well as 
giving rise to the threat of national disintegration. The prosecution found no mitigating 
factors.76 For its part, the defense asked that the men be acquitted, but noted that if the 
judges felt the men were guilty, the court might consider (the defense's contention)
73 Tibo Decision, p. 63. The most incriminating testimony is answer ninety-seven (and to a lesser extent 
ninety-six) of Tibo's deposition on July 31, 2000. In it, he says that, although he left Walisongo before 
anything happened, it was his "crowd" (massa) that perpetrated the murders and arson and that
".. .although I had left the scene; but on my order the red crowd did whatever I wanted." This testimony, 
given in the final of four interrogation sessions in July 2000, contradicts answer fifty-six in Tibo's third 
interrogation session, where he says he did not know whether or not murders had taken place at 
Walisongo. Between the third and the fourth sessions, the interrogator was changed.
74 Interviews with Dominggus da Silva, July 28, 2003, and Marinus Riwu, July 29, 2003.
75 Kejaksaan Negeri Poso, Surat Tuntutan Pidana Terdakwa Febianus [sic] Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Marinus 
Riwu (hereafter Tibo Sentencing Request), March 15, 2001, p. 61. The men's lawyers challenged this 
characterization in their defense piea, saying that the prosecution's identification of Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus as leaders of the kelompok merah was not consistent with the characterization of the kelompok merah 
in other trials. In support of their objection, the defense cited nineteen other indictments relating to the 
May-June 2000 violence in which prosecutors had not mentioned the three men as leaders, and claimed 
that in two of them, prosecutors had named two other men—Lateka and Ngkai Da'a—as leaders.
76 Tibo Sentencing Request, March 15, 2001, p. 68.
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that the men had been trapped into their actions by provocateurs and had been 
motivated by the noble intention to save the Santa Theresia church from rioters.77
In addition to the formal defense, toward the end of the trial the three men also 
submitted a list of sixteen Protestant men to the court, whom Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus claimed were most responsible for the conflict in Poso. The first name on the 
list was Paulus Tungkanan, the retired military officer who Tibo alleges ordered 
various attacks in the May-June 2000 violence. The judges reproduced the list in their 
judgment, thereby making it public. Since the sixteen men were named in court, their 
arrest and investigation have been consistently demanded by Muslim groups in Poso 
who see the lack of prosecutions against the sixteen men as symbolic of injustice.78 In 
any event, the naming of the men did not assist the defense—in their judgment, the 
judges dismissed the issue by saying that it was not within their authority to order that 
the men be arrested and questioned. Naming names did have the effect of shifting 
public attention away from the three defendants, however. After the judgment was 
read out in the trial, the crowd waiting outside the court immediately moved off to the 
Palu house of Yahya Patiro, a former senior civil servant from Poso whose name was 
on the list.79
The Judgment
On April 5, 2001, the panel of judges presiding over the trial pronounced Tibo, 
Dominggus, and Marinus guilty of all three charges and sentenced them to death. The 
judges found that although it had not been proven that the three men themselves 
committed the offences, they had incited others to do so, which they ruled to be 
equivalent under Article 55 of the Indonesian Criminal Code.80 The judges made the 
following statement on this point:
The above discussion and the defendants' interrogation depositions in particular 
provide an indication [petunjuk] that the defendants were among the leaders of 
the kelompok merah who had provided thoughts/ideas to their subordinates to 
perpetrate the attacks/rioting that took place between the kelompok merah and 
kelompok putih, see Anton's testimony, and this caused the deaths of a number of 
people whose bodies were found in several locations.81
77 See Pembelaan dalam Perkara Pidana No. 459/PID.B/2000/PN.PALU (hereafter Tibo Defense Plea), pp. 113- 
114.
78 The idea that the men were all involved in the conflict is now ingrained, but its accuracy is not beyond 
question. Some of the names were supplied to the three defendants by a fellow prisoner; exactly who is 
included on the list has changed over time and, by 2006, police had narrowed the list down to ten men.
79 Patiro was forced to leave Poso after the first period of violence there in December 1998, as a result of 
popular allegations that he was implicated in organizing the violence. "Tibo Cs Divonis Hukuman Mati," 
Mercusuar, April 6, 2001.
80 The men's defense lawyers protested this point in their appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
indictment had listed only one sub-clause of Article 55 (Article 55 (1)1), whereas the judgment appeared 
to also introduce Article 55 (1) 2. The Supreme Court refused to consider this objection specifically, saying 
the reasoning in the lower courts' judgments was correct and that the Supreme Court could not consider 
objections to these courts' judgments regarding proof. See Mahkamah Agung RI, Putusan Nomor: 1225 
K/Pid/2001, October 11, 2001, pp. 44, 72-75, 81.
81 Tibo Decision, pp. 63, 69.
Criminal Justice and Communal Conflict 103
As evidence of the men's guilt for the primary charge of murder, the judges go on 
to mention that the three defendants acknowledged the veracity of their police 
interrogation depositions during the trial, in contrast to what the judges characterized 
as their otherwise evasive testimony. The judges, however, do not state which specific 
parts of the depositions or Anton's testimony support the murder conviction.
The judgment does not always make clear what items of evidence supported each 
conviction or how the judges concluded that the men were guilty of each charge. 
Indeed, although the judgment ran to eighty-two pages, it contained little reasoning: 
the first fifty-eight pages simply list the details of the men's arrest and detention and 
reproduce material presented during the trial. This is typical of most district court 
judgments, however.
Some of the reasoning in the judgment is also shallow. A particular example is the 
discussion of religious grounds for imposing the death penalty, part of a five-page 
section in the judgment on whether the death penalty is appropriate for the case. The 
judges first say that the Qur'an states that punishment must be in equal measure to the 
deed, that the punishment for intentional murder must be death, and that the 
punishment of indirect perpetrators of a crime should be the same as for direct 
perpetrators. No specific Qur'anic reference or religious scholar is cited to support 
these statements, but the judges note that these principles of punishment accord with 
the Indonesian justice system and the legal theory of Yus talionis (retributive justice).82 
Proceeding to Christian concepts of punishment, the judges invoke the Ten 
Commandments, erroneously stating that two of the commandments are to "love your 
fellow man" and "punishment in equal measure for evil deeds for fellow men."83 They 
finally note that Christianity teaches "Man shall surely reap what he sows," again with 
no reference to the verse of the Bible. Elsewhere, they say the death penalty has the 
intention of "preventing other people from perpetrating the same acts as the 
condemned." Finally, in very similar terms to the prosecutors, the judges noted the 
cruel nature of the defendants' acts and the number of people killed during the third 
period, the men's lack of remorse, and the damage to religious harmony as among the 
aggravating factors in sentencing.84
Each of the men appealed the sentence, but their appeals failed at every level of the 
criminal justice system.85 Their appeal to the Central Sulawesi High Court was rejected 
on May 17, 2001, and the Supreme Court rejected their second appeal on October 11, 
2001. Their judicial review request was rejected in February 2004, but this wasn't 
publicly announced until some months later.86 After this, the men employed a new 
defense team—the Team of Human Rights Defenders (TP-HAM), comprising lawyers
82 Tibo Decision, p. 75.
83 The other commandment the judges cited, "Thou shalt not murder," is correct. See Tibo Decision, p. 75, cf 
Deuteronomy 5: 4-18 and Exodus 20:1-17.
84 Tibo Decision, pp. 76-79.
85 The Indonesian legal system has two levels of appeals courts. The defendant (or prosecutors) first lodge 
an appeal (banding) with the provincial high court, and then can appeal (kasasi) the high court's decision to 
the Indonesian Supreme Court. If still found guilty, the defendant may request a judicial review of his 
sentence (peninjauan kembali) by the Supreme Court based on new circumstances, a contradiction between 
the factual bases of verdicts of two or more cases, or a mistake on the part of the judges.
86 The men were informed of the result of their appeal for judicial review on November 27, 2004. See 
"Nasib Tibo Cs di Tangan Presiden," Radar Sulteng, November 29, 2004, p. 1.
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and activists from Tentena, Palu, and Jakarta—to draft a plea for clemency to the 
president of Indonesia. The plea acknowledged that Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus 
had broken the law and must be punished, but challenged the validity of the death 
penalty in the Indonesian justice system and said the uniquely severe punishment was 
inconsistent with the policy of equal treatment. The plea also claimed that the 
circumstances of the conflict ameliorated some of their personal responsibility and 
challenged the fairness of the district court trial.87 When Indonesian President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono rejected this plea on November 10, 2005, all formal avenues of 
appeal were exhausted.88
Objections to the Trial
Before discussing how particular deficiencies in the investigation and trial have 
been repeated in subsequent cases in Poso, it is necessary to pause to consider the 
fairness of the trial in its own right. This is not a separate issue to the impact of the trial 
on stemming violence, because doubts over the trial's fairness meant that the 
proceedings could not serve as a clear record of the men's involvement in violence 
when the case became controversial. Claims of an unfair trial may be unavoidable in a 
conflict setting, what with the highly polarized versions that emerge of what violence 
took place. But the Tibo trial exacerbated this inherent difficulty because aspects of its 
conduct provided needless evidence for claims of unfairness. In particular, the unique 
severity of the punishment handed down to the three men led to suggestions that this 
sentence was the result of religious discrimination.
The three men themselves always questioned the fairness of the proceedings, 
dwelling in particular on the influence they believed the presence of angry crowds at 
the court had on the conduct of the trial. It is true that holding the trial in majority 
Muslim Palu, at a time when many Muslim IDPs had fled to the city from Poso, meant 
that the trial was held in an atmosphere that was hostile to the defendants. It should be 
noted, however, that this is not unique in Indonesia or even in Palu. Also, the presence 
of crowds at the trial does not in itself make the proceedings unfair if there is no 
evidence that their presence influenced those involved.89
Even disregarding the presence of crowds, some aspects of the trial's conduct were 
certainly not in accordance with proper procedure. One example, involving a failure 
on the part of the judges to control the courtroom, involved a witness being able to slap 
the three defendants on the face before giving her testimony. The husband of the 
witness in question had been murdered during the third period of violence, and the
87 TP-HAM, Pengampunan Menuju Rekonsiliasi Sejati, April 13, 2005.
88 Nevertheless, a new defense team calling itself Padma Indonesia succeeded in lodging a second request 
for judicial review. Two hearings were held by the Palu District Court for the defense team to submit its 
new evidence. The Supreme Court rejected this appeal, however. It reiterated that no second judicial 
review was allowable under Indonesian law, but in an apparent concession to the sensitive nature of the 
case, still examined the request and declared it to have no substance. See "MA Tolak PK Kedua Tibo Dkk," 
Kompas, May 10, 2006.
89 To provide a recent example, the trial of Morowali district head Andi Muhammad on charges of 
corruption also took place in 2006 while protests were held outside the court.
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witness herself testified that she had been sexually assaulted by Dominggus during the 
May-June 2000 violence.90
Another aspect of the judges' behavior during the trial led Tibo's lawyers and some 
other observers to believe that the judges had decided on guilt before the trial's 
conclusion. Namely, one of the judges commented during the trial that the witnesses 
the defense had presented were further incriminating the defendants, not assisting in 
their defense.91 Such suspicions were also fueled by the omission from the judgment of 
any mention of the testimony of the three defense witnesses. But neither detail is 
conclusive proof of bias. It is not clear why the judges did not include a record of the 
defense witnesses' testimony in the judgment. They are not required by law to do so, 
and the varied structure of different district court judgments, often poorly assembled, 
makes it more difficult to draw conclusions from this omission.92 Nevertheless, given 
the circumstances of the trial, it showed poor judgment not to at least record the 
defense witnesses' testimony.
The most serious question regarding the fairness of the trial, though, arises from 
the testimony of one key prosecution witness: Anton, the young Muslim man who 
claimed to have infiltrated kelompok merah training in Kelei. Both the centrality of his 
testimony to the murder conviction and the problems with it are reflected in the 
attention paid to Anton in the appeals filed by the lawyers for the three men—seven 
out of thirty-two pages in the appeal to the Supreme Court are devoted to rebutting 
Anton's testimony and questioning his credibility. Several inconsistencies and 
implausible claims in Anton's testimony place heavy doubt on his credibility as a 
witness:
• He testified regarding a far greater degree of training for kelompok merah 
members than anything described in other depositions. Moreover, while 
Anton's account of kelompok merah training is extremely detailed, it is also 
incomplete on some key details—for example, on how, as a Muslim, he was 
able to infiltrate the training. His claim that he attended forty-two days of 
training also makes his testimony inconsistent with the chronology of the 
conflict, as the training has to fit in the gap between the second and third 
periods of violence.
• He testified that 727 factory-standard weapons were airlifted to Kelei for use by 
the kelompok merah. No sign of the weapons was ever found, and the judges 
acknowledged that this aspect of Anton's testimony was not supported by any 
other evidence. They also noted, though, that his testimony regarding weapons 
was not central to the murder charge, and they did not consider his implausible 
claim about the guns to cast doubts on his testimony regarding training.93
90 "Tibo Cs Ditampar di Ruang Sidang," Mercusuar, February 6, 2001.
91 "Bofe: Tidak Sependapat Dengan Pernyataan Hakim," Nmnsa Pos, date not recorded.
92 In any case, the records of the testimony of the three defense witnesses in the defense plea do not 
conclusively show that the testimony of the witnesses would have been relevant to either adjudication on 
guilt or sentencing of the men. The testimony of one of the witnesses, Yosefina, was confined to describing 
the men's presence at the Santa Theresia school. The two GKST members testified mainly that A. L.
Lateka, himself killed during the third phase, was the leader of the kelompok merah. See Tibo Defense Plea, 
pp. 135-139.
93 Tibo Decision, p. 70.
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• Despite the high profile of the investigation into Tibo's activities, Anton did not 
come forward as a witness until early November 2000, more than three months 
after Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus were arrested. Anton's deposition was one 
of the last two included in the dossier, and by the time Anton was questioned, 
the media had reported extensively on the three men's case and the details of 
the May-June 2000 violence.
In addition to the process by which the court arrived at its guilty verdict, the 
unique severity of the sentences against the men in the context of the Poso conflict has 
also led to questions over the trial's fairness, and ultimately contributed to much of the 
Christian anger in Poso upon the executions. Up until the time that the three men were 
executed, no one else had received a sentence longer than fifteen years in cases relating 
to Poso-conflict violence.94 Most sentences—for both Muslims and Christians—have 
been five years or less, even for murder or the equivalent offence under the terrorism 
law.95 96Although the men's sentence is exceptional in comparison to other sentences for 
both Christians and Muslims, various observers have concluded that the severity of the 
sentence indicates religious discrimination against the men.
One of the men's lawyers stated privately after the trial that he believed religious 
discrimination influenced the severity of the sentences.95 The men's defense team also 
made an unsuccessful request at the second session of the trial—in which the defense 
presents its objections to the indictment—on December 14, 2000, to have the trial 
moved out of Palu. The district-court judges devoted little space in their judgment to 
the defense claim of discrimination, rejecting it with a short statement to the effect that 
other people apart from Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus had also been tried and 
sentenced in connection with the conflict.97 However, in the men's plea for clemency, 
the second defense team also raised the question of bias, saying the trial was not based 
on equal treatment. They did this by providing a list of incidents for which the 
perpetrators had not been arrested or received only light sentences. Although the 
lawyers did not say so explicitly, the perpetrators of all the incidents listed were 
Muslim.98
94 This contrast has been reduced by just-completed trials and may be further eroded by trials soon to start. 
For instance, in late March 2007, Hasanuddin, alias Slamet Raharjo, accused of planning the beheadings of 
three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The charge 
filed against him actually carried a mandatory minimum life sentence. Prosecutors also separately 
requested a twenty-year sentence for two accomplices in the beheadings, who were each sentenced to 
fourteen years. Direct observation of trial of Hasanuddin (alias Slamet Raharjo). Direct observation of trial 
of Lilik Purnomo (alias Haris) and Irwanto Irano (alias Iwan), all at Central Jakarta District Court.
95 Exceptions were Herman Parimo, fifteen years; Herry Mangkawa, twelve years; Ferinandus Kuhe, eight 
years; and Sarlis Arima, ten years—all Christians. Andi Ipong, nine years; M. Yusuf, nine years; Fauzan 
Arif, six years; Firmansyah, five years; Fajri, six years; and Nizam Kaleb, six years—all Muslims. Shortly 
after they were executed, another Muslim man, Andi Makassau, already twice sentenced to one year in 
two different Poso-related corruption cases, was also sentenced to six years for an October 2004 shooting. 
Details drawn from relevant court decisions and Simansari Ecip et al., Kerusuhan Poso yang Sebenarnya 
(Jakarta: Global Mahardika Netama, 2001), pp. 119-122.
96 "Penasehat Hukum Minta Tempat Persidangan Tibo Dipindahkan," Pedoman Rakyat, December 15, 2000, 
p. 5. Interview with defense lawyer, January 18, 2002.
97 Tibo Decision, p. 70.
98 See TP-HAM, Pengampunan Menuju Rekonsiliasi Sejati, April 13, 2005.
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The claim that the defendants had been set up as scapegoats also became common 
after the men's plea for clemency was rejected. The three men—all Catholics—made 
statements to the effect that they were sacrificed as "fall guys" to protect the Poso 
Protestant church, and claimed that their lawyer in the original trial advised them not 
to speak out, purportedly to protect the church.99 Admittedly, two members of the 
Central Sulawesi Christian (Protestant) Church (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, 
GKST) did broker the three men's arrests, and the head of the synod at the time did 
distance the church from the men by saying, "We are GKST, they are Catholic." 100 
Nevertheless, several other facts mitigate against any claim that the lawyers colluded 
with the Protestant church to undermine their clients' defense. For instance, Robert 
Bofe, the head of the men's defense team, called on the GKST to take responsibility for 
the third period of violence in an interview with the local paper Mingguan Al-Khairaat 
at the time of the trial.101 Furthermore, two of the three defense witnesses in the trial 
were members of the GKST, and one of them—Rinaldy Damanik—became an 
outspoken critic of the death penalty imposed on the three men prior to their 
executions, by which time he had risen to be head of the Central Sulawesi church 
synod.102
Given the way the case has polarized opinions and the strong emotional response 
that the violence of the third period generated, it is certainly possible that religious 
discrimination played a part in the severity of sentencing. This does not mean, though, 
that the sentences are clear evidence of broader discrimination against Christians in the 
Indonesian courts, either in Poso or in Indonesia as a whole.103
99 The majority of Poso's Christians are Protestant. Some observers, for instance Catholic intellectual Frans 
Magnis-Suseno, have even made the false claim that their lawyer in the first trial was Protestant (Robert 
Bofe, the main lawyer for the men, was Catholic). See transcript of Radio National Encounter program, 
"On Indonesia's Death Row: What Price Justice for Tibo, Dominggus, and Marianus [sic]?," July 9, 2006, 
transcript available at http: / / www.abc.net.au/ rn/ encounter/ stories/ 2006/ 1678465.htm, accessed 
February 23, 2007.
100 For comment made by Reverend Papasi, then head of GKST Sinode, see "Kami GKST, Mereka Kan 
Katolik," MAL, third week, August 2000, p. 6.
101 "GKST Tidak Punya Tanggung Jawab Moral," MAL, fourth week, September 2000, p. 14.
102 Damanik resigned from his position as head of the synod after Tibo was executed, citing a commitment 
to do so he said he had made at the time of the trial. Some community members in Tentena were also 
calling for Damanik's resignation over allegations of irregularities in the GKST's finances.
103 There is not a complete dataset of all trials held as a result of the Poso conflict, but the data I collected 
make some claims of widespread discrimination appear questionable and outright contradict others. For 
instance, Aragon wrote in an October 2001 paper that no "Muslim killers" were tried or sentenced. In fact, 
by that time, several Muslim men had been put on trial for the 2000 murder of local Christian politician 
Gerald Polii during the third phase, with leal sentenced to four years for "aiding murder," while two 
Muslim men were arrested and tried after a December 2000 attack on Sepe village, of which at least one 
served a one-year jail term. In 2005, Aragon wrote, "Christians exclusively are named to fill the malevolent 
posts. As each publicly named puppeteer is killed or jailed, a new one springs forth like a hydra head to 
take his place in media headlines." The implication is that Muslim-owned media only name Christians as 
villains, but Aragon's characterization of media coverage accurately describes the media depiction of a 
succession of at least three Muslim men from 2004-2005, namely Wagiman, Ipong, and Hasanuddin. All 
three have now stood trial—Wagiman was acquitted, Ipong was sentenced to nine years, and Plasanuddin 
received a twenty-year sentence. In 2006, George Aditjondro wrote that Christians were subjected to 
serious court trials and serious sentences while Muslims, be they "provocateurs, local laskar commanders, 
or combatants" invariably escaped legal punishment. More than fifty Muslim men had stood trial by the 
time Aditjondro wrote his article, arguably including representatives of each of his three categories, with 
at least six of these men receiving sentences of more than five years. See Lorraine V. Aragon, "Communal 
Violence in Poso"; Lorrraine V. Aragon, "Mass Media Fragmentation and Narratives of Violent Action in
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In addition, the pattern of government responses to violence in Poso—and indeed 
the response to the conflict in Maluku—may also provide a partial explanation for the 
men's death sentences. The violence of the third period was horrific, and for a time 
thereafter spurred political will to act and hold someone responsible for the violence, 
manifest in the round-up and trial of more than a hundred suspects. Among all of 
these suspects, it was Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus who came to be held most 
responsible. The beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005 generated a 
similar temporary resolve to act, which nine months after the event had begun to fade. 
The widespread condemnation of that attack spurred senior police to become 
personally involved in Poso and resulted in the round-up of suspects—this time 
mostly Muslims—for many of the unsolved cases that had occurred during the 
preceding two years. In Maluku, the trigger for a similar period of political will to 
establish accountability was a May 2005 attack on a paramilitary police post on Seram 
in which five police, their cook, and one of the attackers were killed.104 Around thirty 
men, all Muslims, were brought to trial for this attack and a string of others carried out 
since May 2004. One man—Asep Jaja, a member of the jihadist group Kompak—was 
even sentenced to death in these trials, although the sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment on appeal.
The case is clearer, though, that the government's determination to go ahead with 
the executions was influenced by factors other than just the merits of the case itself. 
Almost no clemency pleas succeed in Indonesian capital cases, but the timing of 
executions is essentially a political decision, as no law currently specifies at what point 
an execution should take place after clemency has been rejected.105 In some cases, it 
make take years for prisoners to be executed after their pleas for clemency have been 
rejected; indeed, in early 2007 there was one person still on death row whose pleas for 
clemency had been rejected in 1972 and 1995.106 But with the high profile of the Tibo 
case, the government was never likely to be able to defer decisive action for that long; it 
either had to execute the men or commute their sentences to life imprisonment. It is 
also clear that some senior government officials, themselves satisfied that the guilt of 
the men had been proven, began to perceive the executions as a band-aid solution to 
address Muslim complaints of injustice in Poso.
Sulawesi's Poso Conflict," Indonesia 79 (April 2005): 1-55; and George Aditjondro, Tibo dan Penyerangan 
Jilid II Pesantren Walisongo, nd.
104 For details of this attack, see ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, pp. 4-6. Four other Muslim 
men received life sentences for the charges arising from these arrests.
105 A 2004 study by the Indonesian human rights monitor Imparsial found only one instance of clemency 
being granted for a death sentence handed down since 1982. The one plea for clemency that succeeded 
was submitted by Kamjai Thong Thavorn, a Thai seaman initially sentenced to death in 1989 for heroin 
possession. Flis plea for clemency was accepted in 1998. An Amnesty International report on the case 
suggested that an earlier unsuccessful plea for clemency had been submitted by prison officials without 
the knowledge of Thavorn or his lawyers. During the same period, there have reportedly been as many as 
thirty-five other cases where clemency has been rejected but the prisoner is yet to be executed, as well as at 
least nine executions since the mid-1990s (not including the executions of the three men discussed here). 
Neither previous president Megawati nor current president Yudhoyono have accepted any plea for 
clemency in a death-penalty case, and Yudhoyono told the media on the occasion of the 2006 International 
Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking that it was extremely unlikely he would do so for any 
narcotics case. See Imparsial, "Jalan Panjang Menghapus Praktik Hukuman Mati di Indonesia," 2004; 
Amnesty International, "Indonesia: A Briefing on the Death Penalty," October 1, 2004; "Presiden Tolak 
Grasi Penjahat Narkoba," bnn.go.id, July 13, 2006.
106 "Komnas HAM Minta Presiden Beri Grasi pada Bahar Matar," Kompas, March 12, 2007, p. 3.
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These sorts of considerations, rather than the comparisons that observers later 
drew between the three men's case and that of the Bali bombers, were likely the most 
important in prompting the government's initial moves toward executing the men. The 
comparison with the Bali bombers probably gained importance as the Tibo case 
developed into a national controversy. Certainly, it would have been particularly 
controversial for the government to commute the sentences of Tibo, Dominggus, and 
Marinus but execute Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Mukhlas, irrespective of the merits 
of either case. To do so would expose the government to accusations within Indonesia 
that it was discriminating against Muslims on account of perceived foreign 
intervention, all the more so after the Vatican sent a letter to the Indonesian 
government in August 2006 petitioning for the Poso death sentences to be commuted.
Even so, the government wavered twice in its decision to execute the men, and in 
so doing maximized the case's negative impact on religious tensions in Poso. The first 
time the executions appeared imminent—in March-April 2006—government officials 
publicly announced several deadlines but then allowed them to pass without incident 
in the face of large protests in Sulawesi, Jakarta, and the men's home, East Nusa 
Tenggara province. The government's next move was to announce another date for the 
executions—August 12, 2006—which deadline also lapsed, seemingly because of 
strong opposition from the provincial police chief in Central Sulawesi.107 By this time, 
though, large protests were taking place in Central Sulawesi both for and against the 
executions, and the case was becoming ever more politicized, with members of 
parliament, the vice president, government officials, community leaders, and activists 
all giving comments to the media.
Finally, the Central Sulawesi public prosecutor informed the three men on 
September 18, 2006, of their impending execution (under Indonesian law, three days' 
notice is required). This time, the police blocked the front entrance to the prison and 
deployed extra security personnel in Palu and Poso. Late at night on September 21 
authorities blacked out the prison lights, and under cover of darkness a convoy of 
vehicles took the men out the prison's rear entrance. Some time in the early hours of 
September 22, Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus were each shot dead in a secluded 
location near the prison. The prosecutor's office denied a request for the bodies to be 
displayed at the Santa Maria church in Palu. Instead, within several hours of his death, 
Dominggus was buried in a roughly marked grave in Palu's Petobo public cemetery, 
while that same morning police flew the remains of Tibo and Marinus to Soroako, in 
South Sulawesi.108
Despite these precautions, the executions triggered unrest, particularly in NTT 
province, but also on a smaller scale in Poso. In NTT, thousands gathered on the streets 
of the predominately Catholic town Atambua and proceeded to burn down the official 
residence of the head of the prosecutor's office, damage several other government 
offices and shops, and raid the local prison and set free all the inmates held there.109 In
107 For their part, on this occasion the prosecutor's office went as far as displaying the coffins they planned 
to use to the press shortly before the executions were planned to take place.
108 Dominggus's remains were exhumed the night after his execution and, in accordance with his family's 
wishes, taken to Flores and reburied there. Tibo and Marinus were each buried in their home villages in 
Morowali district on September 24, 2006.
109 "NTT Rusuh, 205 Napi Kabur," Radar Sulteng, September 23, 2006.
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another town, Maumere, a crowd burned the courthouse and threw rocks at the local 
legislature building and district head's office.110 In Poso itself, crowds of Christians 
threw rocks at police in Watuawu village, injuring the Lage sectoral police chief, and 
burned tires in Tentena.111 The executions also appear to have provided the motive for 
the murder of two Muslim fish traders, Arham Badaruddin and Wandi, who were 
abducted as they passed through Taripa, south of Tentena, on September 23.112 Within 
the very first hours after they took place, it was clear that the executions had 
aggravated old wounds, rather than acting as a band-aid to cover complaints of 
injustice in Poso.
The Tibo Case and the Impact of Other Trials
If some shortcomings of the Tibo trial simply draw its fairness into question, others 
have hampered the contribution that the investigation and trial could have made to 
revealing a comprehensive picture of how violence was waged in Poso. The result may 
be that appropriate action against other key perpetrators was stalled or avoided. Two 
such shortcomings are discussed below. Repeated across many subsequent trials, these 
shortcomings have greatly limited the contribution of court trials to stemming violence 
in Poso.
No systematic approach to prosecution; no clear picture of combatants' command 
structure. Even though Tibo's, Dominggus's, and Marinus's convictions for murder 
essentially came to rest on a notion of command responsibility, neither the prosecution 
nor the judges established a clear characterization of the kelompok merah (as an 
organization or other entity) or of its command structure. Indeed, as the men's defense 
counsel argued during the trial, in other indictments stemming from the third period, 
prosecutors named different Christian men as kelompok merah leaders. As a result, the 
investigation into the involvement of Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus did not provide a 
strong and clear basis for further investigations or prosecutions. This failure to place 
each case within a broader context has become a feature of the prosecutions of both 
Christians and Muslims in Poso. It has arguably limited the number of people brought 
to trial and contributed to a continuing sense of injustice stemming from unsolved 
cases. Moreover, it conceivably has lessened any deterrent effect that fear of arrest 
might otherwise have had on actual and potential perpetrators. It has also meant that 
key planners and perpetrators of violence have remained at large. The final point is of 
particular importance, if we remember that, unlike many other conflicts, in this case 
significant numbers of trials have taken place while the conflict is still in progress.
uo "Atambua berangsur Tenang," Suara Merdeka, September 23, 2006.
111 "Massa Mengamuk, Kapolsek Lage Luka," Radar Sulteng, September 23, 2006.
112 Taripa residents then objected to what they perceived as a heavy-handed attempt on the part of police 
to investigate the disappearances, for the provincial police chief himself came by helicopter to Taripa on 
September 29. A crowd burned four police vehicles and a traffic post. Police eventually located the two 
men's bodies in a shallow grave and arrested seventeen suspects in connection with the murders. The 
murders of Arham and Wandi appear to have triggered retaliatory attacks on three villages in Masamba, 
in South Sulawesi, in which two houses located behind a church were burned. Police swiftly arrested at 
least seventeen suspects for this attack and said they would charge the men under the anti-ferrorism law. 
"Poso Mulai Membara," Mercusuar, September 30, 2006; and "Teror Masamba, Dua Rumah Dibakar," 
Fajar, October 30, 2006.
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While the evidentiary challenges of assembling indictments in cases of large-scale 
violence are often difficult, I would argue police investigators and prosecutors failed to 
pursue at least two clear "entry points" in Tibo's interrogation depositions that could 
reasonably be expected to have enabled them to develop a more systematic picture of 
the kelompok merah's command structure.
The first is Tibo's admission that he had taken part in the May 24, 2000, meeting in 
Kelei, the day after the May-June violence began, in which he says the Protestant 
leader A. L. Lateka ordered the group to raze Poso. Although the meeting appears to 
have brought together several of the more-senior figures of the kelompok merah—such 
as Lateka himself, Paulus Tungkanan, and another man, Yanis Simangunsong—police 
do not appear to have sought further details of the meeting subsequent to Tibo's first 
mention of it during his interrogation.113 A second, similar failure is the lack of detailed 
evidence assembled regarding the structure of the kelompok merah command post 
(posko) in Tagolu, which operated during the May-June violence, and how it came to 
be established. Interrogation depositions in the Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus 
dossiers provide some impression of who was at the posko during the third period, but 
there appears to have been no attempt to develop a clear picture of the hierarchy 
within the command post or its role in coordinating kelompok merah activities.
Instead, it has been the list of sixteen names that Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus 
submitted to the court that appears to have shaped a good deal of the subsequent 
investigations into the third period of the violence. Although police have sporadically 
questioned some of the men on the list, Muslims' demands for these sixteen men to be 
investigated have persisted, and as late as 2006 police declared their intention to bring 
each of the sixteen to meet Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus in a "confrontation" 
interrogation.114 The notion that the sixteen were responsible for the May-June violence 
is now so deeply ingrained in the public psyche that police are hereafter likely to face 
demands to investigate the men almost indefinitely.115 A systematic approach to 
identifying third-period command structures appears the only way to counter such 
demands, regardless of whether such investigations lead to judicial trials or are part of 
a reconciliation process.
Statistical data for the years 2002-2005 also suggest that a nonsystematic approach 
persisted in the investigation of subsequent violence in Poso. During this period, many 
more Muslims than Christians were brought to trial, reflecting the shifting pattern of 
violence.116 Between 2002-2005 there were at least 120 Poso-related violent incidents,
113 The record of the interrogation session shows questioning swiftly shifting to focus on where various 
people led attacks and Tibo's personal involvement in attacks.
114 If this was ever a serious plan, it appears to have been abandoned after Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus 
did not recognize the first of the sixteen men, Yahya Patiro, when he was brought to confront them.
115 Police have periodically declared that not all of the sixteen have links to the violence, saying that the list 
should in fact consist of only ten or eleven men, but they have never explicitly explained the status of any 
investigations into the guilt of each of the sixteen individuals on the list.
116 Although both Christians and Muslims have perpetrated violence during the Poso conflict, most 
violence since 2002 has been directed at non-Muslim targets, in part reflecting the continuing activity of 
mujahidin groups in Poso.
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both in Poso itself and in the provincial capital, Palu.117 In the same period, based on 
court records and media coverage assembled by the author, an estimated fifty to 
seventy people were brought to trial for Poso-related violence. Around a third of the 
men brought to trial, however, faced charges for one of just two incidents: the October 
10, 2003, attack on Beteleme village, in Morowali district, in which two people were 
killed (at least sixteen defendants); and the murder of Fery Silalahi (at least seven 
defendants). In both cases, those standing trial were alleged to be either direct 
participants in the attack or among those who hid the attackers.118
In late 2005-mid 2006, there were some signs that police were beginning to 
acknowledge the need for a more systematic investigative approach. For instance, two 
ad hoc security bodies established in response to serious violence in late 2005 each 
announced that a list of twelve priority cases had been established.119 These cases 
included some of the more prominent incidents of violence perpetrated by both 
Muslims and Christians. While these ad-hoc bodies were operating and the attention of 
senior police was focused on Poso, initial results were promising. Investigations 
appeared to stall, however, when the ad hoc bodies were dissolved.
Instead, the next round of arrests didn't take place until late 2006 and early 2007, 
when police were spurred to act on information gathered months earlier after two 
incidents of violence in October 2006.120 These arrests may well be more far-reaching 
than earlier round-ups in Poso, despite their exclusive focus on Muslim perpetrators of 
recent violence. But the early signs are that the second shortcoming of the Tibo trial 
process, detailed below, may be repeated for these cases.
Shortcomings in Indictments. A second shortcoming evident in the trial of Tibo, 
Dominggus, and Marinus is the prosecutors' failure to make use of all the information 
in the interrogation dossiers when assembling their indictment, or to present evidence 
to support all of the charges that were filed.121 Like the nonsystematic pattern of 
prosecutions, this is a feature of other cases stemming from the Poso conflict as well. It 
has meant that communities have not seen men charged with responsibility for the 
violence that most directly affected those communities, and it has limited the incidental 
function of court trials to establish a record of the violence.
117 Lists of incidents are provided in appendices of ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi; ICG, Weakening Indonesia's 
Mujahidin Networks. The 2004 ICG report contains at least one erroneous incident, the August 28, 2002, 
attack on Sepe, which appears to be a repeated reference to the August 12, 2002, attack.
118 Each of the men charged with the Silalahi murder were acquitted (seemingly correctly) of all charges 
relating to the murder, although some served time for unrelated firearms offences.
119 The two bodies were the Poso Task Force (Satgas Penanganan Poso), established shortly after the 
October 2005 beheading of three Christian school girls, and the Central Sulawesi Security Operations 
Command (Komando Operasi Keamanan— Koopskam), established in response to the December 2005 
bombing of a Palu pork market, which killed nine people.
120 These were the October 16, 2006, murder in Palu of the interim head of the GKST Synode, Reverend 
Irianto Kongkoli, and a clash on October 22, 2006, between police and Muslim youths in the Tanah Runtuh 
neighbourhood of Poso, which took place right before the end of the Islamic fasting month. For a 
summary of these developments and subsequent arrests, see ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, 
January 24, 2007. Before these incidents took place, two Muslim fish traders were murdered in Taripa 
village in late September 2006. Police also arrested seventeen Christian suspects for this attack.
121 In the second instance they may be hampered by the failure of police to investigate adequately the full 
extent of involvement of a suspect in the conflict.
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The failure in the Tibo trial to incorporate all information from the dossiers into the 
indictment is evident from an examination of the murder charge. As outlined above in 
the description of the trial, this charge mentioned four specific murder incidents or 
attacks: on May 23 in Moengko, May 28 in Sintuwulemba, May 28-June 1 in Tagolu, 
and June 1 near Tagolu. In his depositions, however, Tibo admitted to being involved 
in or present at three other attacks: in Sepe/Silanca around May 25, Sayo on May 28, 
and Moengko in late May or early June. Dominggus also admitted to being present at a 
clash in Sayo, in his case probably on both May 27 and 28. In addition to not including 
these incidents, the indictment does not differentiate clearly among the alleged roles of 
each defendant in those murders.
Similarly, the battery charge is confined to cover injuries to just one person during 
a period of violence when hundreds or even thousands must have been wounded. For 
the arson charge, which appeared to be the clearest opportunity to explore the extent of 
Marinus's authority within the kelompok merah, no witnesses were introduced to testify 
about the June 16 attack on Toinasa village.122 As mentioned previously, the indictment 
also omits charges that could have been brought against the men based on information 
in their dossiers, most clearly a charge of sexual assault against Dominggus based on 
the statements of Siti Munawarah and Sufiah Siswandi.
Several subsequent trials stemming from Poso violence have followed a similar 
pattern, with the indictment covering a much narrower range of incidents than those 
with which the suspects had been publicly associated prior to their arrest. Three 
examples should illustrate this pattern. The first is that of Andi Ipong, a Muslim Poso 
resident, sentenced in 2003 to two-and-a-half years' imprisonment for armed robbery 
and then again in 2006 to nine years for a 2001 murder. Prior to each trial, police had 
indicated Ipong was suspected of involvement in a string of crimes, yet in each case he 
was charged with only one.123 The third and most recent example is provided by the 
trial of Irwanto Irano and Lilik Purnomo, which commenced in November 2006 at the 
Central Jakarta District Court. The indictment against the two men confines the 
terrorism and murder charges against them to the beheading of three Christian 
schoolgirls in October 2005. Police had frequently stated before the trial commenced 
that the men were involved in other incidents. Indeed, in a police video that was 
released to the media, Lilik Purnomo admits to being involved in three other murders 
and two attacks on churches, while Irwanto Irano admits to being involved in the 
Tentena bombing, two robberies, a murder, and an attack on a Palu church.124 At some
122 One deposition named Marinus as the leader of this attack.
123 For suspected crimes prior to the 2003 arrest, see ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 19; and "Daftar 
Penembakan Orang," Gatra, March 15, 2003. Prior to the 2005 arrest, Ipong had frequently been named in 
connection with the April 2005 bombing of two NGO offices in Poso and for indirect involvement in an 
armed robbery at the district head's office, also in April 2005. See ICG, "Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin 
Networks," p. 11; and deposition of Ahmad Hi Ali alias Mat Sun, September 22, 2005, p. 6.
124 The edited video is part of an SCTV news broadcast available online; see Pembunuh Siswa SMA Poso 
Diancam Hukuman Mati, http: / / video.liputan6.com/files/hukrim/ vid/081106cposo_gab.rm, accessed 
November 17, 2006.
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point in the investigation, however, the decision appears to have been made to limit 
the charges against the two men to just the beheadings.125
Of course, mere suspicion that an individual is involved in violence or even a 
confession of guilt—particularly outside a courtroom setting—do not automatically 
mean that police and prosecutors will be able to assemble sufficient evidence to gain a 
guilty verdict in a court trial. But lack of evidence does not always appear to have been 
the primary reason to exclude specific cases from indictments. A case from Maluku 
best illustrates this. Asep Jaja was sentenced to life imprisonment for his involvement 
in the May 2005 attack on the police paramilitary post on Seram Island. He also 
appears to have been implicated in a murder in Tomohon, North Sulawesi, in October 
2001.126 Asked whether Asep would be charged with this murder, too, a senior 
detective in Maluku indicated that he was aware of the case but said Asep would only 
stand trial for the Tomohon murder "if he didn't get the death penalty in Maluku."127
When limited funds and investigative resources are available, such an approach to 
investigations and prosecutions is perhaps understandable, particularly when proving 
an individual's involvement in additional incidents is not likely to increase their 
sentence. The clear downside, as mentioned above, lies in denying communities a clear 
record of who was responsible for particular acts of violence. Not charging individuals 
for involvement in particular incidents when they have been publicly named as 
suspects also denies the accused individuals a chance to challenge the accusations 
against them in court, and in recent times has fueled community claims that police 
have deliberately "stigmatized" young Muslim men without having clear evidence 
against them.
Conclusion
This paper describes the particularities of the Tibo trial at some length and 
demonstrates how some of the shortcomings of the trial and investigation have been 
repeated in other cases. We can draw several lessons from the above discussion for 
how criminal justice might have been handled differently in Poso, and could be better 
handled in future instances of Indonesian conflict.
The first lesson is to hold trials swiftly after the violence occurs, as leaving cases 
unaddressed for long periods of time is as likely to generate community disaffection as 
it is to cause passions to lessen. A key factor, though, to making a success of swiftly 
held criminal investigations and trials is the political will to devote sufficient resources 
to communal conflicts such as Poso, and maintain those resources beyond the initial 
crisis. In Indonesian conflict settings, the scale of violence has proved too great for just 
the normal police and prosecutors assigned to the province. National-level assistance 
for investigations and prosecutions is required, so that a systematic approach to the 
violence can be adopted. The necessity of a systematic approach is evident from the
125 Early indications are that a similar process is occurring for some of the men who have been arrested or 
surrendered since late 2006. Whether this is the case will become clear when these men are brought to 
trial.
126 ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, pp. 8-9.
127 Phone interview with senior detective, Maluku Provincial Police, 2005.
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Tibo case, where essentially symbolic prosecution of only a few individuals from 
among all the key perpetrators did little to answer community demands for justice. A 
"symbolic" approach to prosecutions also negates one of the primary advantages of 
swift trials, namely, that key perpetrators can be removed from the conflict setting 
before they perpetrate further violence.
The response to more recent crises in Poso, particularly the October 2005 beheading 
of three schoolgirls, gives cause for optimism that, with sufficient political will, police 
and prosecutors can achieve swift results. Even in the case of the beheadings, though, 
the full potential efficacy of court trials was hampered by a seeming wavering of 
attention once the crisis faded. Another key example in support of swift trials comes 
from the Maluku conflict. The arrests and trials there in the wake of a May 2005 attack 
on a police post on Seram Island appear to have had a stark preventative effect on the 
level of violence in Maluku. The arrests and trials came at the end of twelve months of 
sporadic violence in Maluku, in the aftermath of the most recent riotous episode there 
in April 2004. To some extent, these arrests went beyond netting just direct 
perpetrators to apprehending those accused of planning and, in one individual's case, 
financing violence. Despite some disquiet regarding the length of the sentences, which 
seemed long given the generally lax judicial response to crimes committed earlier in 
the conflict (five of the men received life sentences), there have been no conflict deaths 
in Maluku in the twenty-two months since the arrests were made, with only two minor 
bombings causing injuries during that period.128
The second is the importance of paying particular attention to the procedural 
quality of the trial. One reason this attention is needed is because the difficult and 
polarizing nature of the crimes committed in the course of inter-religious violence can 
make it particularly difficult to hold a fair trial. Attention to procedure may also help 
to avoid needless problems in the future, by ensuring that the clearest possible case for 
guilt is presented and that nothing about the conduct of the trial gives rise to the 
impression of bias. That is to say that it is important that justice not only be done, but, 
to the greatest extent possible, also be seen to be done and done fairly. In large part this 
comes down to political will, in the form of assigning experienced prosecutors and 
judges to cases, or even moving selected cases to Jakarta, as has been recent practice for 
Poso.
The third lesson is to pursue consistency in sentencing. As the Tibo case shows, 
community attitudes to a sentence in one case will be influenced by the sentences in 
other cases. Stern punishment in one case is more likely to meet opposition if 
communities perceive that other, similar cases have been dealt with only leniently or 
not at all. Such opposition will never be eliminated entirely in a conflict setting, but it 
can be minimized by trying to avoid stark contrasts among similar cases' sentences. 
This again underlines the importance of a systematic approach to prosecutions.
The fourth lesson, a point related to lesson three, is that even in pursuing 
consistency, imposing the death penalty in conflict cases should be avoided. This need 
not be a moral argument; the practical benefit of not creating a "cause" or a focal 
point—an execution, a martyr—for protestors is significant. The Tibo executions have
128 The main security disturbance during this period has in fact involved several clashes between 
Indonesian police and the military.
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already directly contributed to at least two additional deaths, and will likely continue 
to complicate future trials concerned with Poso's serious violence.
In making the case that trials are a necessary part of conflict response and 
resolution, I am mindful of their clear downsides. The polarization of the debate 
regarding the three men's executions along religious lines, which sharpened old 
religious enmities from earlier in the conflict, highlights one potential pitfall. Part of 
this polarization arose from the specific features of the case, but it is reasonable to 
assume that court verdicts for conflict or post-conflict violence will always run the risk 
of displeasing some sections of affected communities. But on this point, it must also be 
kept in mind that many of the arrests and most trials stemming from the Poso conflict 
have, in fact, passed without significant community protest.
Certainly, more research is needed to survey attitudes to criminal trials in Poso. 
That study could follow along the lines of two studies conducted to assess empirically 
community attitudes to international tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda; those 
studies explored the link between trials and reconciliation.129 Tentatively, however, I 
would like to suggest that trials in Poso can still make a positive contribution to 
conflict resolution even if they do generate a degree of polarization of opinion along 
religious lines. This is because the contribution to stopping violence by arresting key 
perpetrators may outweigh any worsening of religious enmities that those arrests may 
cause in the community.130 One reason this may be the case is that many of those who 
harbor resentment over the conflict or the official response to violence will not act on 
those feelings and actively perpetrate additional violence, particularly if the risk of 
arrest and punishment is clear.
Where protests over arrests and trials have occurred, they have most often 
involved primarily those closely linked to the suspects as members of the same 
combatant group or their relatives. When these protests have spread more widely, 
there has generally been an additional factor at work.131 For instance, when crowds 
gathered in June 2005 to demand the release of those held for involvement in the May 
2005 Tentena bombings, wrongful arrests were an issue. It later emerged that none of 
those held in custody at the time appeared to have actually been involved in the 
bombing. Moreover, some of those in custody had been badly beaten. When attempts 
to arrest a group of wanted (Muslim) men resulted in a gun battle between police and 
supporters of the suspects on January 22, 2007, during which fourteen civilians and a 
policeman were killed, police violence was one of the issues. To be sure, the Muslim 
suspects were prepared to fight the police to remain free, but the additional support 
these men received from others in Poso resulted from lingering resentment over some 
killings that occurred during another police raid two weeks earlier, as well as a clash
129 See Miklos et al., "Attitudes toward Justice and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia," in My Neighbor, My Enemy, pp. 193-94; and Longman et al., "Connecting Justice to Human 
Experience: Attitudes toward Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda," in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 
pp. 206-25.
130 This possibility is not considered in the Miklos and Longman studies (see previous footnote), which do 
not explicitly consider the relationship between openness to reconciliation on the part of communities and 
the occurrence of further violence.
131 For details, see ICG, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks, pp. 15-16.
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between police and residents of the same neighborhood in October 2006.132 In both of 
those cases, the suspects' supporters were also able to exploit the issue of officials' past 
failure to prosecute other cases to corral support.
Finally, it is necessary to note that I'm not arguing that trials can work in isolation 
to stop violence. Economic, social, and reconstruction assistance from central and 
provincial governments, as well as local and international NGOs, are well-established 
as standard responses to large-scale conflict in Indonesia. Poso has not been an 
exception in this regard, having received a great deal of this assistance since the peak 
of conflict in 2000-2001. Clearly such programs should remain part of a comprehensive 
response to conflict, but in the absence of systematic law enforcement, those programs 
have not in themselves been effective in stemming post-conflict instability, either. 
While there is much that criminal trials cannot address, and significant political will is 
required to provide the resources to support criminal justice in a conflict setting, the 
experience of Maluku in particular suggests that trials can play an important role in 
stemming violence by removing key perpetrators of violence.
132 For details of the January 22 raid and the others that preceded it, see ICG, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on 
the edge, pp. 16-17. The challenges police faced in making these arrests were significant, but an important 
focus for investigation of these incidents will be whether all steps were taken to try to avoid these 
fatalities.
